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After a quick profile of Italian foreign direct investments since 1900 and a short review of 
the main explanations of the lagged multinational growth by Italian manufacturing 
companies, a quick glimpse of business histories is given to the only two still today living 
“old protagonists” (Pirelli, Fiat) and to three old corporate groups (Olivetti, SNIA Viscosa, 
Montecatini-Montedison) who had also reached a significant degree of full 
internationalization early in the XX century, but during the second postwar period underwent 
profound dismantling of their original business mission. Finally the paper focuses on few 
cases of “new protagonists,” mid-size family companies who undertook a true multinational 
strategy only in the most recent decades and today represent the core of the Italian “fourth 
capitalism.” 
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 1.  Introduction
1 
Within the whole architecture of “Italy and the world Economy” research project, this 
paper must be seen as a peculiar mix of some short business histories and a survey of 
available data on Italian direct investment abroad. 
Our protagonists are strictly defined as multinationals (or transnationals), i.e. groups 
that sooner or later decide to go beyond the pure export strategy (i.e. producing domestically 
in single or multiple plants and selling to foreign commercial intermediaries or direct foreign 
clients), by undertaking direct investments abroad, with domestic housequarters keeping 
majority or full control of production units, or at least commercial units (distribution and 
after-sale) located outside the domestic boundaries. A rather consolidated body of economic 
theories explains the decision to “go multinational” rather than simply “selling abroad.” This 
theoretical framework applies to manufacturing and service activities, since the standard 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in extractive, agricultural and other raw materials sectors 
are basically targeted at ensuring secure access to natural resources unavailable domestically 
and subject to geo-political risks. This is the case, among others, of the recent China’s 
massive investment in agricultural land and mining in Africa and Latin America, somehow 
reminding in a completely different historical context the old European colonial (“land 
grabbing”) investments. In a nutshell, the determinants of this decision of a national 
exporting firm to become a multinational firm can be summarized in the following way. The 
home country firm’s “ownership advantages” (knowledge, experience, technological and 
other invisible assets) become more profitable and growth-enhancing in the medium and 
long run either by: a) achieving a better proximity to local customers, making faster 
adaptations to the standards of local demand (“market seeking” strategy, looking for a 
crucial source of market power in pricing and distribution channels), and/or b) exploiting 
input cost differentials (“cost-saving” strategy), given the role played by economies of scale 
(multiple plants located in different countries rather than a single domestic plant) and taking 
distance and related transport costs into account, and/or c) gaining new knowledge from the 
economic and technological environment of the host country (“non-natural resource 
seeking”). A large empirical evidence, through direct opinion surveys as well as econometric 
tests, leads to conclude that “market seeking” is by far the major determinant of foreign 
direct investments, compared to the more popular “cost saving” (delocalization) and to the 
rather episodic “knowledge resource seeking.” 
 The choice between undertaking the direct investment abroad or just opting for a “non 
equity investment,” such as licensing own “blueprints” to an independent or majority local 
partner, depends on the degree of risk aversion, managerial resources, financial strength and 
ultimate growth targets of the domestic firm. Thus “ownership advantages” combined with 
“locational advantages” and with “internalization advantages” are the basic ingredients of 
FDIs. 
2  
                                                           
1  Strong contribution by Mario Perugini as research assistant is gratefully acknowledged.                                                               
2 Dunning (1983), Cantwell (1989), Markusen (1998). For an in-depth survey of the literature see Barba 
Navaretti-Venables (2004). 
5 The paper is organized as follows. A quick profile of Italian foreign direct investments 
over a long time span is provided in Section 2, based for 1900-1981 on the only available 
study on the sheer number of investors grouped by main sectors and broad geographical 
areas (Section 2.1). Section 2.3 dwells very shortly on the main explanations of the lagged 
(compared to other advanced European countries) multinational growth by Italian 
manufacturing companies. Then a short survey of more detailed data for the most recent 
quarter of a century, starting in the mid-1980s, is the subject of Section 2.4, based on a new 
rich database built on collection and selection of various available sources (from balance 
sheets to press news and direct interviews) by a group of scholars of Milan Polytechnic. This 
database contains disaggregated data on yearly and cumulative flows of manufacturing 
turnover and employment, including disinvestments and degree of capital control. Since 
2010 ISTAT has started to make available official data on Inward and Outward Foreign 
Affiliates Sales (FATS), but so far without any previous historical series.  
A quick glimpse of business histories is given in Section 3 to the only two still today 
living “old protagonists” (Pirelli, Fiat), who were born in the late XIX century. Section 4 
points to three corporate groups (Olivetti, SNIA Viscosa, Montecatini-Montedison) who had 
also reached a significant degree of full internationalization early in the XX century, but 
during the second postwar period underwent profound dismantling of their original business 
mission, through a series of radical dismissals and restructuring, so that today they can be 
considered “one-season protagonists” as Italian multinationals. Section 5 focuses on “new 
protagonists:” dozens of mid-size companies, all family companies with strong external 
managerial skills, some of them being born even few generations ago but having undertaken 
a true multinational strategy only in recent years of the postwar period (e.g. Marzotto, Zegna, 
Piaggio, Italcementi, Recordati, Zambon, Bracco). These companies are fully representative 
engines of what has been called the Italian “fourth capitalism,” spanning over a wide array of 
traditional and modern sectors. Among this today rather large corporate population, we 
chose six short case histories drawn from three sectors (clothing, chemicals, motor vehicles). 
Further examples of this category could be provided in a subsequent work. 
Section 6 draws some concluding remarks on the long-term evolution of the Italian 
multinationals. 
2.  A quick profile of the long run Italian multinational growth 
2.1   From 1880 to early 1980’s 
Multinational growth of Italian companies lagged behind the historical record of other 
European countries, where the first internationalization phase for the manufacturing industry 
started in 1880.
3 Based on data from the only available study on investments by Italian 
multinationals from 1900 to 1981,
4 the first isolated cases of foreign production expansion 
date back to the first decade of the 1900s (Table 1). During this period, named as the 
Giolittian expansionary phase, Italian companies opened six production subsidiaries;
5 partly 
                                                           
3 Dunning (1983). 
4 Acocella (1985). 
5 Excluding subsidiaries that were solely commercial. 
6greenfields and partly result of acquisitions or incorporations of pre-existing companies. The 
reach of the Italian industrial system beyond national borders strengthened in the interwar 
period; the ‘20s saw the establishment of six more subsidiaries and in the ‘30s ten more were 
created. The largest number of new foreign companies controlled by Italian firms were 
founded in the four years from 1929 to 1932. 
The prevailing explanation of the peak in Italian outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in this period is the response to the deflationary policies implemented since 1927 by 
the Fascist regime. This reaction, by those companies more oriented toward foreign markets, 
was intended to compensate for fluctuations in domestic demand on one hand, and on the 
other hand to reinforce exports, despite the new unfavourable conditions.




9 confirm, the revaluation of the lira to “Quota 90” 
vis-à-vis the pound sterling affected the decision to either boost production capacity of 
foreign facilities or create new ones. 
                                                          
Overall, in the first four decades of the XX century Italian companies founded 22 
foreign production branches (Table 1). However, in all likelihood this is a conservative 
estimate, considering that official statistics do not take into account crucial data such as the 
Italian participation in foreign joint-stock companies operating both in manufacturing and 
mining. In the first fifteen years of the century, foreign subsidiaries included textile and food 
producers (in particular vermouth and alcoholic beverage), yet there were also firms 
operating in more modern sectors of the Second Industrial Revolution. A case in point is 
rubber, with Pirelli’s production facilities or subsidiaries spread over several countries, as 
well as an extensive export business since the first decade of the 1900s (see par. 3.1). The 
interwar period saw a significant rise of leading food companies building up their foreign 
business (Cirio, Martini and Rossi, and Cinzano), but more importantly some new companies 
entering the international market, such as SNIA (artificial textiles), FIAT (automobiles), 
Montecatini (chemical products) and Olivetti (office machines): see Sect. 3 (“Old 
protagonists”) and 4 (“One season’s protagonists”).  
The geographic distribution of investments also reveals a number of remarkably new 
phenomena. Before the first World War, Italian companies had invested primarily in Latin 
America (particularly Argentina), while foreign subsidiaries founded in developed countries 
accounted for only a third of Italy’s total, compared to two-thirds for continental European 
countries. However, in the twenty years following WWI, the geographic range of 
investments was appreciably enlarged. France became by far the leading area for 
investments, where four of the ten subsidiaries were established from 1929 and 1932; 
Germany and the US were also included among the top locations.  
Overall, approximately 70% of the new Italian subsidiaries in the interwar period were 
located in developed countries with a medium to high level of industrialization. This marked 
a clear reversal of the previous trend before 1914. In addition, FDIs encompassed a wider 
 
6 Paradisi (1976). 
7 Castronovo (1971). 
8 Spadoni (2003). 
9 Perugini (2009). 
7variety of sectors with higher levels of specialization. From 1920 to 1939, the more 
technologically advanced sectors (no longer only food and textiles) made the greatest 
contribution to the expansion of Italian manufacturers beyond national borders, including 
rubber and tire, transport equipment, chemicals and artificial fibers, paper, electromechanical 
engineering, office machines.  
Foreign expansion of Italian firms was accelerated during the ‘50s and early ‘60s, a 
period coinciding with the strongest Italian economic growth performance in the postwar 
period, pulled by a record expansion of both domestic demand, domestic saving and export 
in a rapidly integrating European market (the so-called “economic miracle”). Keep in mind 
that in the two decades 1950-71 Italy managed to achieve a 4.9% annual growth of per capita 
income, well above the 3.8% for the European average. While in 1950 the Italian per capita 
income was one third that of the US, in 1970 it had become two thirds.
10 In 1963 the 
investment/GDP ratio reached a record 25%, the Italian saving propensity in those two 
decades was second only to the Japanese one, well above 20%. Until the 1969 “Hot 
Autumn,” which signed a turning point in industrial relations, in those two decades Italy 
went through a record growth of output and productivity (pulled by rising capital/labour ratio 
and younger stock of capital) with a prolonged wage moderation. At the same time an 
excellent profit performance was a powerful incentive to new investments, which in their 
turn induced rapid shifts of labour force from traditional to more modern and faster 
innovating sectors. 
11 Thus investing abroad was not a clear priority for business reaping the 
benefits of a lively domestic expansion. 
Anyway, in the ‘50s, 35 new manufacturing subsidiaries were opened, more than the 
total number for the entire first half of the century. Direct investment was no longer an 
exception, but rather it was becoming a common growth path for major companies already 
more or less strongly export-oriented. In particular, from 1945 to 1954 Italian firms were 
most active in electromechanical engineering and the office machines sector, with eight 
international subsidiaries (see again Table 1), mainly reflecting Olivetti’s internationalization 
strategy. The company founded by Adriano Olivetti had already made some FDIs before 
1945, but in the following three decades became a protagonist on the world market (Sect. 
4.1). In the chemicals sector, mainly due to Montecatini and SNIA (Sect. 4.2 and 4.3), the 
second half of the 1950s saw a remarkable surge of FDIs, a takeoff by mechanical and 
electro-mechanical engineering, while a temporary slowdown in the growth of foreign 
subsidiaries was registered in transport equipment. In the latter case, this was due to a strong 
focus of Fiat’s growth strategy toward the booming domestic automobile market. 
In the ‘60s the number of Italian affiliates operating in the international market rose 
further, led by the fast expansion of the newly formed ENI-AGIP in the oil and gas 
extraction worldwide, under the aggressive leadership of Enrico Mattei who challenged the 
international oligopoly of the oil “seven sisters.” Mechanical and electromechanical 
engineering sectors saw the highest number of direct investments, with 14 and 12 
subsidiaries respectively.  
                                                           
10 Toniolo (2004)   
11 See among others Rossi-Toniolo (1996) and Rey (1982). 
 
8In both these sectors three-fourths of the new investors were small to medium sized 
companies, while there was a downturn in investments by large enterprises, in particular 
Olivetti. In the first half of the ‘60s, chemical companies continued to rapidly 
internationalize production, with extremely aggressive strategies such as Montedison’s 
establishment of Novamont in the US, compared to other major European producers’ 
approach in the same period. However this expansion came to an abrupt halt in the late ‘60s 
(see Table 1). The rubber sector was actually the only one that saw an increase in 
investments in the latter half of the ‘60s, mirroring Pirelli’s growth strategy (Sect. 3.1 
below). 
The overall economic scenario changed dramatically during the ‘70s and early ‘80s: 
dwindling profit margins under the pressure of rising wages and slowing productivity growth 
(labour unrest), inflationary impact and rapidly deteriorating trade balance from the first oil 
shock, accompanied by marked depreciation of the lira following the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods exchange rates regime. The slowdown in domestic demand spurred major efforts to 
expand exports, while attempts by the Bank of Italy to put credit ceilings and penalties on 
short-term capital exports created a domestic macroeconomic environment relatively 
unfavourable to long-term planning of business multinational expansion. During the 1970s 
and the 1980s the highest number of investments was concentrated in mechanical 
engineering (21 subsidiaries), transport equipment (20), electromechanical engineering and 
office machines (19), rubber (19), and food (15). The internationalization process continued 
uninterruptedly for the entire period in these industries, albeit following different paths.  
On the contrary, expansion among chemical companies became more volatile once 
again.
12 However, the ‘70s was also a time of major divestments, in particular in automotive, 
electric machines and office machines, and in the chemicals industry. As regards the first 
two sectors, this was primarily the result of reorganizations by Fiat involving its foreign 
operations, and by Olivetti, preparing for a new internationalization phase which would 
begin in the early ‘80s. Divestitures recorded in the chemicals industry, instead, were 
attributable to a sector crisis rather than foreign portfolio reorganization.
13 
One should also notice that, compared to other major “strong currency” countries such 
as Japan, Germany, Netherlands, at least until the mid-80s Italian external competitiveness 
was supported by creeping depreciation of the lira exchange rate, so that Italian companies 
were relatively less induced to pursue cost-saving strategies of direct investment in low-
wage countries aimed at gaining competitiveness in labour intensive activities.  
                                                           
12 In fact, after the stagnation of the late ‘60s, investments picked up again from 1970 to 1974 (9 subsidiaries), 
but in the subsequent five-year period, the slowdown of foreign investments among Italian multinational 
chemicals companies led to a decrease in the total number of new entries (5 subsidiaries). Other sectors, 
instead, experienced major growth from 1975 to 1979 (textiles with 8 new entries, and the mineral processing 
sector with 10), thanks to the entrance of new firms on the market. 
13 Acocella (1985). 
9The latter half of the ‘80s brought about a renewed international expansion among 
major Italian firms, bolstered by the reorganizations of the ‘70s.
14 Multinational expansion 
took the form of acquisitions as well as production agreements and partnerships, and was no 
longer limited to developing countries. On the contrary, priority was given to American, 
European, and (less often) Japanese partners. However, these moves represented almost the 
swan song of the large Italian companies on international markets. 
2.2  Recent trends  
Since the mid-1980s the process of “going abroad” to become multinational companies 
has been on an upswing trend (data from Reprint) and a new phase began, marked by entry 
of new players and diffusion of new internationalization models. A significant number of 
medium-sized firms took the lead, replacing to some extent the large groups which kept a 
deceleration profile in their multinational growth. The elite club of direct international 
investors expanded its membership: from 1985 to 1995 the number of Italian companies with 
international holdings rose from 263 to 621.
15 Underpinning this new phase, on one hand, 
was the development of specialized medium-sized firms characterized by high organizational 
flexibility. These companies, often organized in multi-plant groups, also operated in sectors 
which previously had seen relatively little multinational growth, such as textiles, clothing, 
and specialized mechanical engineering. Other direct investments involved household 
appliances, the food industry, and the steel industry.
16 On the other hand, new opportunities 
arose from the fuller integration of the Single European market, the fast growth in China and 
other Asian countries, the opening of the economies in Central and Eastern Europe.  
It must be emphasised that, given the three main determinants of outward direct 
investment already reminded in the Introduction, suggested by well established theories 
(market seeking, cost saving, resource seeking) the growth of Italian multinationals was 
mainly pushed by the first one (better market penetration of foreign markets, through both 
purely commercial affiliates and production facilities closer to final customers) than by the 
other two. One should only add a peculiar propensity, mainly by small and medium-size 
Italian companies, to undertake a softer approach to international business, through minority 
joint ventures and a wide range of “non equity investments” (licensing and other forms of 
technology transfer, commercial agreements, production sharing and the like), especially 
when entering the market of newly developing countries. 
17 
 Nevertheless, Italy being a latecomer in this respect, the Italian share of the world 
stock of outward direct investment (3.06%) still today is between one half and one third 
compared to the major European countries (France 9.09%, UK 8.70%, Germany 7.25%; Fig. 
1), even less than Spain (3.40%). The ratio of this stock to GDP (Fig. 2) grew very fast from 
5.3% in 1990 to 27.4% in 2009, but this trend was also common in other European countries, 
                                                           
14 Balcet (1997). Production realized abroad by the major industrial groups (Fiat-Ifil, Olivetti-Cir, Pirelli, 
Montedison-Ferruzzi, Eni and Iri) grew by 60% from 1985 to 1988, a result of numerous acquisitions, 
especially in Europe. 
15 Cominotti-Mariotti (1996).  
16 Onida (1994). 
17 Oman (1984; Onida et al. (1985). 
10so that in this respect in 2009 Italy was much behind Germany (41.2%), Spain (44.2%), 
France (64.9%) and UK (76.0%).  
2.3   Why latecomer Italian multinationals? 
The main reasons for Italy being a latecomer as an outward investor in the postwar 
period can be summarized as follows.  
a) A the much higher share of micro and small enterprises (about 55% of 
manufacturing employment), who face greater entry cost as international producers.
18 This 
remark symmetrically calls into question the progressive disappearance of big business in 
the Italian postwar history, starting with the nationalization of the electricity industry in 1964 
and going through the managerial failure of the big State holdings (IRI, EFIM, GEPI). But 
this issue goes much beyond the scope of this paper. 
b) The composition of manufacturing industry, with a significantly larger share of 
output of sectors producing traditional consumer goods and specialized machinery, sectors 
that are typically less oriented to FDIs while maintaining a high export propensity, in 
comparison with scale-intensive and science-based industries such as basic chemicals, big 
pharma, steel and non-ferrous metals, road vehicles, professional and consumer 
19 electr
eal exchange rate acts as an incentive to bear the cost 
of for
 investing domestically – and in particular in the Mezzogiorno – rather than 
abroad. 
21  
                                                          
onics.   
c) The macroeconomic environment of the 1970s and early 1980s rather unfavourable 
to capital outflows: rising external deficit, foreign exchange controls, credit tightening. In 
addition the prolonged weakness of the lira exchange rate since the early 1970s throughout 
the 1990s contributed to increase the entry cost for potential Italian investors abroad 
(symmetrically an appreciation of the r
eign greenfields or takeovers).
20 
d) The heavy share (until the early 1990s) of State-owned enterprises precisely in those 
sectors (scale intensive and research intensive) that are more FDI-oriented: indeed for 
obvious political reasons the State ownership (with the exception of ENI) has always been 
focused on
 
18 In 2007 out of 510.000 manufacturing firms in Italy there were 430.000 micro-firms (1-9 employees), against 
212.000 in France, 173.000 in Spain, 118.000 in Germany. These micro-firms accounted for more than 25% of 
total manufacturing employees (about 1,2 million) against a EU average of 13.9%; reciprocally the share of 
manufacturing employees in large firms (more than 250 employees) was 22% vs. the EU average of 40.6% 
(Germany 53.2%, France 46.3%, Spain 26.0% (ISTAT 2010, p. 52). The anomalous size distribution of Italian 
firms compared with other major countries is a recurrent theme in the literature on Italian economic 
development: see among others Traù (1999), Onida (2004), Banca d’Italia (2008). 
19 See among many others De Nardis-Traù (2005), Garonna-Gros-Pietro (2004), Banca d’Italia (2008). 
20 Ciocca (2007).  
21 Nardozzi (2004, pp. 61-64). An extensive analysis of the role played by Italian SOEs (“Partecipazioni 
statali”) is provided, among others, by Barca -Trento (1997). According to de Cecco (2004) the political-
economic crisis of the early 1970s in the aftermath of the “Hot Autumn” has been a turning point in the postwar 
Italian industrial development, ultimately leading to a progressive competitive decline in absence of repeated 
devaluation of the lira before the new euro regime.  
11 
As a complementary additional explanation of Italy’s lagging propensity to cost-saving 
FDIs in developing areas – compared to major Central European countries and Japan – one 
must recall the strongly dualistic pattern of development, which at least in the 50s and 60s 
impli
e tration,” “reaction to 
prote
nd with the newborn WTO (1995) accompanying 
rapid
Italian manufacturing firms subject to some 
2.4 
a available about Italian outward 
direct investment for little more than the last two decades. 
                                                          
ed the relative availability of low-cost suppliers in most domestic Southern regions.  
Therefore no wonder that in one of the earliest field studies on strategies of 75 Italian 
multinationals (in-depth questionnaires-interviews), performed in the mid-80s, the “cost 
reduction” motivation was far less important than “market p ne
ctionism” and even “acquisition of international experience.” 
22  
The relatively recent growth of Italian multinationals must be seen in the context of a 
changing macroeconomic framework started since the early 1980s. A major reversal in 
labour relations, with more accommodative Trade Unions and declining labour unrest, was 
triggered in Turin by a strong reactions of Fiat’s white collars against the overflow of pro-
communist TU leadership (the so called “march of 40.000” in October 1980), soon followed 
by inflation abatement through wage de-indexation (remember the potentially explosive 
impact of the second oil shock in 1981-82) . Other major events that basically contributed to 
a growing awareness by SMEs of the opportunities linked to multinational expansion were: 
the first entry of the lira in the European Monetary System in 1979 (a sort of a disguised 
crawling peg to the Deutsche Mark); the agreement by all EU members to start an ambitious 
project of “Single European Market” with strong commitments to gradual reduction of 
technical non-tariff barriers to intra-European trade and factor mobility (1986); the crash of 
Berlin wall bringing about (after a first sharp downfall in output) a fast recovery of the new 
CEE (Central Eastern Europe), rapidly followed by and eventual enlargement of the old EC-
16 to EC-27; the end of the Uruguay Rou
ly expanding international markets.  
The dramatic crisis of the lira of 1992-93, quickly followed by a sharp fiscal 
consolidation and sizeable privatizations paving the way to entry of the lira in the newborn 
Euro (1998), also contributed to a domestic economic environment not particularly favorable 
to ambitious multinational expansion by 
financial squeeze and organizational stress.  
An overview of data from Istat and Reprint  
Now let us take a look at the only quantitative dat
 
22 Onida-Viesti (1988, p. 76). With few exceptions the bulk of  major operations by Italian multinationals in 
that period was concentrated in Europe and USA. At the time of this study, aside from ENI-AGIP extractive 
investments in oil-gas producers and a substantial presence of FIAT group in Brazil, Argentina and Turkey, 
major cost-saving investments by Italian multinationals in developing areas were GFT in Mexico, Miroglio in 
Tunisia (both in textile- clothing), Farmitalia C.Erba (Montedison group) in Latin America and Indonesia, SGS 
Microelettronica in Singapore and Malaysia; see Onida-Viesti (1988). 
 
12Only in 2010 Istat (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) has started to monitor the Italian 
outward FDI according to the European standard definitions of FDI.
23  
In 2008 there were 20.972 foreign affiliates under control by Italian residents, with 
almost 1.5 million employees, a turnover of €386 billion generating an estimated local value 
added of €93 billion (net of financial intermediation activities). Manufacturing affiliates 
were less numerous than service affiliates (31% of the total) but accounted for 50% of 
employees, 38% of turnover and 44% of local value added. Employees in these foreign 
industrial affiliates were 16.4% of Italian industrial employment. This “degree of 
internationalization” was far lower in service sectors (trade, transport and logistics, hotels-
restaurants, real estate, business services), except banks and financial intermediation where it 
was almost 37%. 
The other unofficial but very accurate and much more detailed source of information 
concerning outward and inward Italian FDI is Reprint, a database collected by Politecnico 
di Milano which for many years was restricted to manufacturing activities but has 
subsequently been covering main non-financial services.  
According to the latest report from Reprint
24 on January 1
st 2009 there were 6426 
Italian direct investors with 22.715 affiliates abroad (82% under full control), accounting for 
1.352.070 employees (75% in fully controlled affiliates) and a turnover of €460 billion (80% 
by fully controlled affiliates; Table 2) Out of the 18.692 affiliates under control, only 5.052 
belonging to 2.327 investors were operating manufacturing units (although accounting for 
almost 689.000 employees i.e. more than 2/3 of the total employment abroad) , while 9.605 
were wholesale affiliates (with almost 148.000 employees). The remaining 4.035 affiliates 
were classified within energy, extractive and construction industries as well as transport, 
telecom and other professional services. 
25 The geographical composition of the stock of 
employees in foreign affiliates can be found in Table 3. 
The comparison with two decades earlier from the same Reprint database can only be 
made for manufacturing groups. At its starting date 1.01.1986 there were 282 Italian 
manufacturing investors of which 180 with fully controlled foreign affiliates, accounting for 
152.010 employees. Thus since the mid-80s the number of manufacturing investors has seen 
a more than tenfold increase (from 180 to 2327), while the size of employees abroad has 
grown about 4.5 times (from 152.010 to 689.000), a clear evidence of the rapidly increasing 
weight of small and medium-size investing companies. 
After a careful classification of company size taking into account their belonging to 
groups, today (1.01.09) even micro and small companies (up to 49 employees) are 
responsible for almost 30% of the total number of investors, although for only 12.7% of the 
number of affiliates, 6.9% of employees abroad, 3.8% of foreign turnover. Almost 53% of 
                                                           
23 ISTAT (2011). 
24 Mariotti-Mutinelli (2010). 
25 Mariotti-Mutinelli (2010, Table 2). About 80% of investors, with same proportion of affiliates and foreign 
employees, are companies located in Northern regions. Lombardy’s weight alone is  35% of the total, followed 
by Veneto and Emilia-Romagna, each with 14% of affiliates and around 11% of foreign employees: Mariotti-
Mutinelli (2010, Table 2.18).   
13investors, with 38% of affiliates and less than 18% of foreign employees, are medium size 
groups  (50-249 employees). Medium-large and large Italian multinational groups (250 
employees or more) are only 17% of the total number of investors but are responsible for 
49% of foreign affiliates, 75% of foreign employees and 87% of foreign turnover.
26  
The trend of yearly flows (new affiliates) has topped at the end of the 90s, then has 
been shrinking dramatically until 2003, then slightly recovering since 2004 but more slowly 
than the prevailing trend in worldwide foreign direct investments. 
27 
 The balance between new initiatives and dismissals of existing affiliates has been far 
lower over the 2002-2008 period relative to the 1990s, and the same balance in terms of 
employees abroad has been near zero in the recent decade (Tables 4, 5, 6 from Mariotti-
Mutinelli 2010, p. 42).  
Looking at long-run trends in the percentage composition of investors and their 
affiliates in terms of the four-fold Pavitt classification,
28 the major change has been a 
substantial increase of “supplier dominated” or “traditional sectors” (basic food, textile-
clothing, leather-shoes, furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing) in the first period from 1986 
to 2001, reaching a share of 33% of investors and 23% of affiliates (followed by a slight 
decline) basically at expense of the share of “scale intensive sectors” (fallen from 75% of 
employees in 1986 to 53% today). 
29 
Drawing from the Reprint which published a full list of 263 Italian multinational 
manufacturing investors on 1.01.1992, we could find: (a) 6 very large-size investing groups 
(at least one affiliate under control with 5000 or more employees) namely IFI-Fiat, Pirelli, 
STET-Italtel, Poligrafici editoriali, IRI-Finmeccanica, IRI-Ilva (ENI being ruled out as an 
extractive and service multinational); (b) 12 large size groups (at least one affiliate under 
control with 1000-4999 employees): Bonomi-Saffa, CIR (Olivetti-Valeo-Sasib), Cragnotti 
Partners, ENI, Fata, Ferrero, Ferruzzi (Montedison, Eridania, Farmitalia Carlo Erba, Gardini 
Srl), GFT, GIM (Orlando), Marzotto, Perfetti, Ruggerini; (c) 22 medium-large groups with 
at least one affiliate with 500-999 employees): Alpi, Barilla, Belleli, Benetton, Beretta, 
Buzzi, Candy, Cartiere Burgo, El.Fi (Ocean), Fochi, Findim (Star), GFT, Riva, IRI-
Fincantieri, Lanificio Zegna, Merloni Elettrodomestici, Fidenza Vetraria Spa, Parmalat, 
Piaggio, Redaelli Tecna, Romalfa (Rifil Saninvesti), Rusconi Editore (Cominotti-Mariotti 
1992). 
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14Almost  two decades later, not only ( as just noticed) did the small and medium 
investors greatly increased their participation, but half of large and very large size groups 
and about one third of the medium-large ones have disappeared or have been replaced or 
have undergone profound restructuring. On the other hand, one third of top 15 Italian 
multinationals includes today major groups operating in non manufacturing activities such as 
bank-insurance (Unicredit, Intesa SanPaolo, Generali) and extractive-energy-telecom 
services (ENEL, ENI, Telecom Italia). 
3.  Old Protagonists 
3.1 Pirelli  
Pirelli & C., founded in Milan in 1872, was one of the first Italian industrial groups to 
undertake  an internationalization process. In fact, the company’s first foreign direct 
investments date back to the late 1800s, just a few years after its foundation. As with other 
European companies,
30 the group’s early internationalization was a response to weak growth 
both on the domestic market, and in Pirelli’s specific sector: the production of elastic rubber 
goods, and in particular electric and telegraph cables. From the outset, this was a sector with 
strong monopolistic tendencies, in which a number of large European companies were 
already operating when Pirelli was founded. One of the company’s early achievements was 
successfully breaking into the international market of underwater telegraph cables, thanks to 
an aggressive commercial strategy.
31  
Pirelli opened its first subsidiary in 1901 in Spain, thanks to the valuable contacts that 
the company had established with this country in years prior.
32 At the turn of the century, 
following a decision taken by the Spanish government to raise customs duties on certain 
products, including electrical conductors, Pirelli had to rethink its penetration strategy for 
that country. To bypass the costly new import tariffs, and to ensure a greater scope of 
operations in Spain, the Milanese parent company opted to open a factory near Barcelona, in 
Villanueva y Geltrù.
33  
In Great Britain the company first established a trading partnership, Pirelli Ltd. of 
London in 1909, and later built a factory for producing rubber goods in Burton-on-Trent in 
1929. Prior to this, Pirelli had already constructed two manufacturing plants for cable 
production located in Southampton (in 1913) and in Eastleigh (in 1927), partnering with 
General Electric Co. of London. In the same way, Pirelli founded commercial subsidiaries in 
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Peninsula; see Pirelli (1946). 
33 Bezza (1987, p. 411). 
15Austria, Belgium, France, and Argentina in the first decade of 1900; these subsidiaries too 
were quickly transformed into local companies.  
The aggressive commercial strategy, which characterized the group’s entire initial 
internationalization phase, came to an end with the conclusion of World War I. Until that 
point in time the company’s leading products were linked to the electro-technical sector (as 
we also saw in the development of foreign subsidiaries). However, from the mid-1910s, 
starting around the time of the crisis of 1907, tires took on greater importance. Tire 
production had actually begun at the end of the 1800s, with the first bicycle tires produced in 
the early 1890s. However, it was only with the new century and the advent of the automobile 
that tires began to have a sizeable impact on the company’s revenues. For example, in 1907, 
tires accounted for only 8.3% of Pirelli & C’s turnover, but in 1912 this quota rose to 23.7% 
of total sales.
 34  
Two factors prompted Pirelli to reorganize the entire group, and consequently, its 
governance model: growth in size at an international level, with an eye to differentiating risk 
at a sector and geographic level, and the mounting importance of the tire sector. Thus in 
1920, Compagnie Internationale Pirelli (CIP) was founded in Brussels in order to take 
control of foreign holdings, including rubber plantations recently purchased in Java and 
Malaysia. At the same time, a new company was created in Italy, Società Italiana Pirelli 
(SIP), which took over control of all production activities previously handled by Pirelli & C. 
Indeed, Pirelli’s two parent companies, one responsible for Italian business and one for 
activities outside of Italy, would remain a characteristic of the group until the 1980s.  
In the mid-‘60s, after an unsuccessful attempt to form a partnership with Europe’s 
leading group Michelin, Pirelli began lengthy negotiations with the English company 
Dunlop in the spring of 1970, with an eye to a merger between the two companies. 
Weakness in the tire sector was a serious problem for both groups. Dunlop’s market share 
was negatively affected by growing international competition with the group’s percentage of 
the industry’s total sales dropping from 50% in the postwar years down to 35% in the early 
‘70s.
35 Likewise, Pirelli was facing competition of American companies – Firestone and 
Goodyear above all – in Italy, as well as market penetration by Michelin, which had opened 
a factory on the peninsula in the ‘60s. Toward the end of the decade Michelin signed an 
agreement with Fiat stipulating that the Italian car manufacturer would buy part of 
Michelin’s shares in Citroën, and more importantly, that Fiat would abandon Pirelli as a 
supplier and put Michelin tires on its automobiles instead.  
An agreement between Pirelli and Dunlop was signed in June 1971, with a complex 
share swap.  Pirelli’s national assets were concentrated in a new operating company – 
Industrie Pirelli SpA. All this resulted in the creation of a multinational group that ran 210 
factories located on five different continents, and employed 178,000 people. The new group 
– the Union Pirelli Dunlop - realized global turnover in excess of 2 billion dollars, and was 
third in the world ranking of the tire industry, after Goodyear and Firestone. The Union had 
a solid level of complementarity both in terms of product offering and geographic 
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16distribution of its business (at least on paper). If indeed Pirelli was predominantly in the 
European and South American markets, Dunlop had substantial business in the US, Asia and 
Africa. Overlap was negligible, limited only to a few European countries: Great Britain, 
France, Germany and Spain.
36  
Despite the high degree of complementarity, this entity created in the summer of 1971 
was never conceived as a true merger. Instead it was seen as a partnership “between equals,” 
limited to the symmetrical exchange of shares with no real repercussions in terms of the 
financial or production synergies of the two groups, which continued to run their respective 
industrial operations in total autonomy. The performance of the Dunlop partnership was 
immediately jeopardized by the rapid deterioration of Pirelli’s position on the Italian market, 
due to a sharp increase in labour costs, a drop in the demand for cars, and competition from 
Michelin. The heavy losses incurred by Industrie Pirelli SpA (in 1972, over 80 million 
dollars, more than a third of total share capital) prompted Dunlop to “freeze” its shares and 
to refuse to contribute to recapitalizing the company. In subsequent years, Industrie Pirelli 
SpA underwent an extensive series of reorganizations, but the company would not return to 
profitability again until 1980. In the meantime, by the late ‘70s the fallout from the 
international crisis in the tire sector had impacted the English side of the Union, creating 
additional friction between Dunlop and Pirelli, until the partnership was dissolved in April 
1981. 
With the dissolution of the Union, Pirelli found itself in the same situation as ten years 
before, facing the same problems that had prompted the company to seek out an international 
partnership in the late ‘60s, namely, the group’s activities were still undersized for the tire 
sector. In a context of progressive market concentration, a global strategy became more and 
more critical.  
Pirelli stepped up its expansion strategy again in 1988, when the company attempted to 
make two major acquisitions on the international market: Firestone and Armstrong, 
respectively a big and a smaller American tire producer. The first was a defensive move, 
intended to thwart a merger between Firestone and Bridgestone. By acquiring the American 
company, Pirelli would have risen to the third place in the world ranking, behind Goodyear 
and Michelin, with turnover in the tire sector of over 5 billion dollars. The move would also 
have solved another troublesome problem: the lack of a direct presence on the US market. 
Nonetheless, the deal was never finalized, as Bridgestone responded to Pirelli’s takeover bid 
by presenting a counteroffer which the Italian group’s executive management considered 
disproportionately high. So, the decision was made to abandon the takeover attempt.  
In the Armstrong takeover, instead, Pirelli had greater success; it took effect in the 
spring of 1988. However, obviously this last acquisition did not carry the same weight as the 
Firestone deal would have done. Clearly, there is little comparison between the two groups: 
one was a local producer, albeit a fair sized one; the other a major international group, with 
the third highest turnover in the world. Pirelli achieved its goal of initiating production 
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17activities directly in the US, but had to abandon its hope of dimensional growth, an objective 
that had been recognized as a key to success in the globalized market that was coming into 
being. 
The early ‘90s marked a critical juncture for the Pirelli Group. At this time, in fact, a 
change of strategy evolved that would significantly shape subsequent development. The first 
consequence was the decision to specialize the company in high value added, niche 
production and give up the search for an alliance with another major European producer. 
This reversal followed the company’s latest major defeat in the field: an attempt to make a 
merger with the German company Continental, which took place between mid-1990 and the 
end of the following year. The operation, scheduled to be finalized by year’s end 1991, had 
propitious beginnings. Indeed, the top management of the most important German financial 
and insurance institutions, contacted by Pirelli, approved of the project. Pirelli management, 
confident of a fairly smooth merger, pledged to reimburse the investors who backed the 
Continental deal if the tire business was not concentrated in a single company by 30 
November 1991. The merger would have resulted in a company with a global market share 
of approximately 16%, and a business volume of over 9 billion dollars, placing Pirelli on par 
with Bridgestone-Firestone, behind only Michelin and Goodyear. 
However, when the Pirelli proposal was formally examined by Continental’s corporate 
boards, it was considered a hostile takeover and rejected as being contrary to the interests of 
the company. The major German Continental shareholders (Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen, 
BMW, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank) joined ranks in opposing the project and despite 
continued negotiations, amid various vicissitudes, until November 1991, the merger 
agreement never materialized.  
The costs of this failure were enormous. As mentioned above, the Pirelli Group had 
agreed to indemnify the investors who backed the Continental project by 31 December 1991 
for loss of assets and costs incurred if the tire business were not unified in a single company. 
This debt, in addition to the devaluation and the expenses sustained directly by the group, 
brought the total estimated cost of the Continental operation to over 295 million dollars in 
1991.
37 
The catastrophic impact of the deal on the group’s finances and the new decline in 
global tire demand from 1990 to 1991 forced Pirelli to abandon the strategy it had followed 
since the first decade of the twentieth century, namely trying to become one of the major 
world players. Instead, the group decided to downsize its production capacity and specialize 
in market segments with higher value added. This goal was achieved in the ‘90s by 
decreasing the level of production diversification and spinning off less profitable production 
lines. 
38  
The reorganization succeeded in regaining financial equilibrium by the mid-‘90s, and 
set a slow transformation of the group in motion. In fact, Pirelli gradually abandoned some 
of its traditional sectors in order to diversify in new areas: real estate and 
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18telecommunications.
39 From 1999 to 2001, the optical systems and optical components 
businesses were sold to the American companies Cisco and Corning respectively for 
approximately €4 billion. In 2001, this liquidity was used to buy controlling interest in 
Telecom Italia, previously the public telephone monopoly. Only four years later, after the 
heavy debt incurred to finalize this buyout, Pirelli was forced to sell its historical Cables 
Division along with Energy Systems and Telecommunications, to Goldman Sachs. With the 
sale of the Cables Division, Pirelli lost one of its historical production lines, which in the 
first years of business had enabled the company to establish itself at an international level in 
a high-tech segment, and later to survive the crises of the ‘70s and the reorganizations of the 
‘80s.  
In April 2007, after several months of tension – at a political level as well –, Pirelli 
sold its shares in Telecom Italia to Telco, a new finance company created for the purpose of 
allowing the Spanish firm Telefónica to buy into Telecom Italia’s share capital. Thus, Pirelli 
abandoned the telecommunications sector to focus once again on tires, with investments in 
new factories in Romania, Russia and China. However, the Group’s industrial component, 
after the divestments of the ‘90s and ‘00s, proved to be irreversibly weakened with respect to 
the predominance it had achieved in its financial and real estate businesses. 
3.2   Fiat 
The Italian automobile sector, within the broader context of the Italian industry, was 
the first notable exception to the development model based on import substitution. Italian 
companies succeeded in acquiring new product and process technologies in a timely fashion 
and in so doing could compete with the most industrially advanced countries in the world, 
both on domestic and foreign markets. Fiat, founded in Turin in 1899, rose to prominence 
for having based its initial development phase on an export strategy.
40 The company’s 
expansion from 1905 to 1907, for example, was fuelled by foreign sales, which accounted 
for around two-thirds of turnover. During World War I, despite the pressing demands from 
the Italian front, the supply of trucks and vehicles to Italy’s allies made up approximately 
40% of total production. Exports rose further to 60-65% in the early ‘20s, only to plummet 
to just above 20% in 1933 when the crisis hit.  
After opening a Spanish subsidiary in 1919, the company later founded other 
subsidiaries in almost all the countries in Europe, and some others outside the continent as 
well.
41 This frenzy of initiatives had powerful reverberations on export trends. In fact, from 
the late ‘20s to the early ‘30s, Fiat was the European automobile manufacturer with the 
highest ratio of exports to production, with an average quota that exceeded 60%. The 
expansion of the sales network, however, came to an abrupt halt with the outbreak of the 
global crisis. For this reason during the ‘30s only three other affiliates were opened, in 
                                                           
39 Sicca-Izzo (1995). 
40 Bigazzi (1986, pp. 209-264; 1991, pp. 77-168). 
41 Poland and Turkey (1920); Romania and Switzerland (1921); Yugoslavia and Germany (1922); Argentina 
(1923); England (1924); Germany, Bulgaria, Ireland, Austria and Czechoslovakia (1925); Greece and France 
(1926); Brazil (1927); Egypt (1928); Portugal (1929); Denmark and Sweden (1930); see Bigazzi (1991). 
19Hungary, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies. Subsequently the export rate levelled out at 
around 35% of total production at the end of the decade.
42  
As regards foreign production, instead, prior to the war Fiat had acquired minority 
shares in two licensees in Austria (1907) and the US (1909). This was a step toward a direct 
investment strategy in production. However, implementation of this strategy was slowed by 
the inconsistent results attained from these initial production agreements with foreign 
companies, which were profoundly shaped by political issues as well as market instability 
involving various countries in question.
43 A clear strategic turning point in Fiat’s foreign 
business occurred only toward the end of the ‘20s. The transition from assembly to 
production in some of the main sales markets coincided with an increasingly difficult export 
climate, due to the revaluation of the lira, an increase in customs duties, protectionist 
measures implemented on all markets, and the war against imports waged in several 
countries by local producers. As a result, at the end of 1928, Fiat began experimenting with 
assembly lines. In Germany, the company partnered with NSU to buy a factory in Heilbronn, 
while in England and France, Fiat opened plants in collaboration with local companies.  
In 1930-31, it was Spain’s turn, where the Turinese company entered the market with a 
majority share in the Fabrica nacional de automòviles of Barcelona and Hispano of 
Guadalajara, retooling the latter’s factories in order to assemble cars locally. In 1933, Fiat 
took control of Austro-Fiat, and in 1934 founded Simca in France; this marked the transition 
from assembly, done on an increasingly wider scale, to complete production. At this time, 
the company made plans in various stages to build a production facility in Hungary. 
Meanwhile, assembly operations began on a much smaller scale in Batavia, in the Dutch 
East Indies, during the period of economic sanctions against Fascist Italy. In addition to 
these direct initiatives, the company also entered into production licensing agreements with 
Walter in Czechoslovakia (1930) and on a much larger scale with the state-owned Pzinz 
plants in Poland (1931). 
Until the start of World War II, the foreign market remained vitally important to Fiat’s 
growth, in particular throughout the ‘30s. During this period, in fact, exports proved 
necessary to guarantee the plants in Turin a sufficient scale of production, due to the crisis 
and, above all, the monetary restrictions implemented along with the autarchic policies in 
Italy. Nonetheless, exportation represented an activity capable of ensuring acceptable profit 
margins only in markets that were large in size and easy to reach, both geographically and as 
far as demand segmentation. 
Fiat found these conditions on the French market. In 1926, a subsidiary was created 
called Société anonyme française des automobiles Fiat (Safaf), entirely controlled by Fiat. 
The new organization quickly achieved impressive results, and in 1928 sales already counted 
nearly 4,000 units. In 1930, the transition from an ad valorem tariff to a weight-based tariff, 
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20more costly for imports, prompted Fiat to make a further move. The company decided to 
make a substantial increase in assembly activity in France, and finally in 1934 the company 
founded Simca (Société industrielle de mécanique et carosserie automobile), with the aim of 
further boosting the share of value added realized in France. Sales topped 7,000 units in 
1936 and peaked at 20,935 units in 1938
44. With this exploit Simca became the fourth 
largest car manufacturer in France. 
                                                          
At the end of World War II, Fiat’s strategy underwent a profound transformation in 
order to adapt to the new situation. In Italy, as reconstruction gradually made headway, a 
strong latent demand for private automobiles emerged. What the market needed was a small 
size car which, thanks to its low running costs, could satisfy a clientele with limited buying 
power; this car was to be produced in large volumes in order to adequately exploit the 
economies of scale made possible by new technologies. In 1955 Fiat presented the first 
authentic Italian people’s car – the 600 – followed by a further consolidation in 1957 with 
the launch of the Nuova 500. The surge in production was spectacular: in 1950 for the first 
time ever more than 100,000 vehicles were produced in a year, but in 1960 production 
topped 500,000 units and in 1966 it exceeded 1.5 million mark. 
As regards the internationalization process, it is important to emphasize that this 
accentuated quantitative dynamic should have had a powerful impact on export opportunities 
for Fiat. In actual fact, however, the competitive advantage Fiat gained from the increased 
production volumes only had a limited effect, due to the particular production orientation 
that the Turinese manufacturer had adopted to serve the domestic market. The Italian market, 
in fact, was characterized by a strong preference for vehicles which, on average, were much 
smaller in size than cars in demand in other major industrialized countries. Consequently, 
Fiat inevitably ended up specializing in market segments corresponding to lower categories 
of cars with respect to other countries. Fiat’s forced specialization on small cars not only 
meant a limited foreign market, but also fewer research and development opportunities 
capable of generating sophisticated technological innovations in car design. Even the impact 
on Fiat’s image was not insignificant, since outside of Italy the company became known as a 
carmaker specialized in small vehicles. 
By the mid-‘60s, it was clear to the owners and top managers that the only solution to 
the weakened international reach of the group lay in an alliance with another European 
producer. In 1967, Fiat decided to sell its shares in Simca to Chrysler, in light of an 
imminent opportunity to buy into Citröen share capital with a sizeable quota. This plan took 
shape in October 1962 through a cooperation agreement and the purchase of 15% stock in 
the French group by Fiat, which consequently became the number two shareholder after 
Michelin. The next step was taken in 1970, when after a capital increase by Citröen, Italian 
participation rose to 26.9%. At this point, however, opposition from French shareholders 
began to grow. What Fiat had in mind was to gradually integrate the two product ranges and 
to rationalize the production capacity to pave the way for a marked increase in productivity 
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21and competitiveness of the two brands. For Citröen, instead, the primary intention was to 
safeguard the identity of the French manufacturer by keeping the two brands distinct. 
In addition, opposition from French government circles and from other European 
carmakers played no small role. In fact, the former objected to the merger on the grounds of 
national prestige, and the latter was against Fiat strengthening its position on the French 
market. Finally, the partnership was dissolved in 1973, and in 1976 Michelin sold its 
controlling stake in Citröen to Peugeot, with the approval of the political powers, who 
preferred an all-French solution. 
The failure of the Citröen agreement coincided with the start of a drastic decline in car 
demand on the European market, the first after a period of unprecedented, uninterrupted 
growth since the end of World War II. A relatively brief drop in demand from 1973 to 1975 
(recessionary impact of the first oil crisis) was followed by a longer downslide from 1980 to 
1984, making it necessary for car manufacturers to initiate deep reorganization processes. In 
1984, just when signs of market recovery - and more importantly Fiat’s competitiveness - 
were in sight, the company began to contemplate the possibility of striking a deal with 
another car maker, specifically Ford. A merger between these two industrial concerns 
appeared particularly attractive in terms of production economies, in light of the extensive 
overlap in the product ranges of the two brands.  
The simple merger would have made it possible to create a formidable industrial 
concern with a production capacity of over 3 million cars per year, and a quarter of the 
European market share.
45 However, if on one hand the far-reaching agreement showed signs 
of synergies and presented interesting productive and industrial opportunities, on the other 
hand the very size of the deal emphatically underscored the issue of control of the joint 
venture which would come into play with the merger. The rift between the two partners on 
questions of control and governance of the new group led to a breakdown in negotiations in 
the fall of 1985. 
This setback could not help but impact the internationalization strategy of the Turinese 
manufacturer. The most important repercussion was Fiat’s realization that partnerships were 
only feasible if decision-making power was clearly allotted to the respective partners from 
the outset. Consequently, as the group resumed its internationalization process during the 
second half of the ‘80s, Fiat gave priority to projects involving foreign partners who were 
both financially and industrially weak. The strategy Fiat adopted was therefore to expand 
and consolidate the group’s presence in Eastern Europe and in emerging economies.  
Expansion into emerging markets was considered vital to the Turinese carmaker, 
which found itself contending with a relentless downslide in European sales; also, in the 
early ‘90s, Fiat was definitively overtaken by Volkswagen in the ranking of European car 
makers. The strategy drawn up to achieve expansion was implemented beginning in 1993 
with the development of global production of a family of world cars
46 - called Project 178. 
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22These would be adaptable to a wide range of uses and a number of different emerging 
markets with particular product needs. These new models were produced first in Brazil in 
1996, and later in Argentina in 1996-97. In 1997 production started in Poland and in 1998 in 
Turkey. Again in 1997 an assembly plant opened in Morocco, followed by one in India and 
South Africa (1999), Egypt (2000) and China (2002). Despite this, sales results of world cars 
were much lower than anticipated, peaking at 442,180 vehicles in 1997, and falling to 
349,470 in 2001, only a fraction of the one million projected cars sales for that year.
47 
From 1990 to 2001 Fiat’s share of the Italian and European market dropped from 
52.8% to 34.7% and from 14.3 to 9.6% respectively, only to suffer even more drastic 
contractions from 2002 on, as the company was hit by an extremely severe crisis. In 2001, 
the Fiat Group as a whole incurred losses of €4.2 billion, with an overall debt exceeding €6 
billion, while in 2002 losses in the automobile sector alone totalled €2.7 billion. A rigorous 
cost containment plan and an industrial relaunch enabled the group to return to profitability 
in 2005, but because of the crisis, foreign direct investments were curbed. The critical 
situation facing Fiat brought about a strategic transformation, underscoring the fact that 
partnerships with other big manufacturers were unavoidable.  
Fiat’s search for another carmaker as a potential partner in order to survive the crisis in 
the automobile market seemed to have come to a successful conclusion in 2000, culminating 
in an exchange of share capital and a cooperation agreement with General Motors in the field 
of engine and platform production. However, the GM partnership, which was to lead to Fiat 
Auto’s incorporation in the American group, was dissolved in 2005. This was mainly due to 
the precarious financial health of the American group, which was forced to pay Fiat 2 billion 
dollars following a put option by Fiat Auto included in the 2000 agreement. 
In the summer of 2009, with new prospects emerging to extend its international reach, 
Fiat announced that it had finalized a global strategic partnership with Chrysler Group LLC. 
With this agreement, Fiat acquired 20% of the American group, with the possibility of 
increasing this share to 35% subject to meeting certain targets foreseen in the contract. The 
Italian group would later be able to obtain up to 55%, but could not acquire majority shares 
until Chrysler’s debts from US government bailouts were entirely paid back. 
4.  One season’s protagonists 
4.1 Olivetti 
Olivetti was founded in 1908 by Camillo Olivetti, for the purpose of designing and 
producing typewriters
48. In the early ‘20s the company began to export its products, and at 
the end of the decade Olivetti opened its first subsidiaries with their own production 
facilities in Spain (Barcelona) and Argentina (Buenos Aires).  
The company’s postwar recovery was led by Adriano Olivetti, son of the founder, and 
was underpinned by a deep transformation of the production structure and commercial 
strategy. Advances in terms of efficiency and cost cutting were considerable, and made 
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23production diversification possible in the direction of the first calculating machines, a market 
segment that promised significant opportunities for international expansion. By the mid-’50s 
more than half of Olivetti’s production was exported; from 1950 to 1961 Olivetti exported 
seven times more typewriters, and an amazing 23 times more calculating machines.  
Olivetti expanded its business in Latin American by creating the commercial branches 
Olivetti Mexicana and Olivetti Colombiana, and by opening a new factory in Argentina. In 
Europe, instead the company founded British Olivetti Ltd and Olivetti Buromaschinen A.G 
in Austria. By 1958 three more foreign production facilities opened in Scotland, Brazil and 
South Africa.
49 Olivetti shored up its commercial network in the years that followed by 
opening new subsidiaries both in Europe (Denmark and Sweden before 1961; Holland, 
Greece and Finland by 1969) and in South America (Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay and Chile).  
By the end of the ‘60s, Olivetti had fully achieved an international aspect, with 
operations in the biggest markets in Europe, and North and South America. At this point 
there were 30 commercial subsidiaries in countries where Olivetti had set up its own direct 
network, a number that would more or less remain unchanged until the late ‘90s. In 1968, the 
group’s Italian turnover accounted for less than 20% of the total, lower than US turnover 
(27.3%). The company had 33,255 foreign employees, as compared to 27,426 in Italy. 
However, it was the company’s foreign presence as a producer, beyond the international 
dimension of its market, which made Olivetti a full-fledged multinational. Again in 1968, 
around 35% of Olivetti’s production was realized outside of Italy. In 1969, the group’s 
industrial plants numbered 11 in Italy and 10 abroad, counting assembly plants 
(Johannesburg, Toronto, Bogotá, and Santiago, Chile) and integrated works (Barcelona, 
Glasgow, Buenos Aires, San Paolo, Mexico City, and Harrisburg in Pennsylvania).
50 
In this phase, the most important internationalization experience for the company 
began in 1950 when Olivetti embarked on its commercial penetration of the enormous 
American market, founding the Olivetti Corporation of America (OCA) in New York. 
Finding a low level of competition in the calculator segment (with Remington Rand 
representing the only real competitor), Olivetti was able to base its growth strategy on 
product quality and innovation, rather than price leadership. By 1958, America had become 
Olivetti’s main export market, absorbing more than 20% of sales realized abroad. In October 
1959, after brief negotiations, Olivetti signed an agreement to pay 8.7 million dollars for 
35% of Underwood stock, a company with an extensive sales network and a prestigious 
name in American industry. The aim of the acquisition was to create a solid direct presence 
on the American market, which was considered crucial to achieving growth. However, there 
were also negative aspects of the operation, primarily attributable to an underestimation of 
the serious obsolescence of Underwood’s factory in Hartford (Connecticut), the result of a 
lack of investments in previous years.  
Olivetti management carried out a deep reorganization of Underwood at a production 
and organizational level; in 1960 the daily output of the Hartford factory nearly tripled, 
while production costs dropped by 30%. Nonetheless, results were very disappointing. The 
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24financial commitment required to turn the American company around was particularly 
burdensome; additional losses were discovered, previously concealed in Underwood’s 
balance sheets, factories were dilapidated, and reorganizations proved more costly than 
anticipated. A few years after the fact, Olivetti claimed that it had spent 48 million dollars 
from 1959 to 1964 to acquire and reorganize Underwood, but according to a Harvard study 
the actual amount was closer to 100 million.
51  
By early 1963, the costs of the Underwood deal, combined with enormous investments 
in electronics made by the company beginning in the mid-‘50s,
52 had sunk Olivetti into a 
severe financial crisis, further aggravated by a drop in demand on international markets. In 
May 1964 a rescue consortium made up of industrial concerns (Fiat, Pirelli) and financial 
institutions (Mediobanca, IMI, and La Centrale) intervened by acquiring 25% of the group’s 
share capital, and effectively taking over control from the Olivetti family.  
In 1964, in order to restore the company to financial health, the new owners decided to 
sell a 75% stake in the Electronics Division to a new joint-venture – Olivetti-General 
Electric – created with the participation of the American colossal General Electric, which 
bought the remaining 25% in 1968. With this deal Olivetti left the sector of medium and 
large electronic calculators, but continued its work, with its own resources, in designing and 
producing terminals and small systems only.
53 The technological transition from 
electromechanics to electronics and computers initiated in the ‘50s came to a standstill, and 
an historical opportunity was lost: to move into the new world of computers with a head start 
on many international competitors. The recovery strategy that management decided to 
implement from the late ‘60s to the early ‘70s involved consolidating the company’s position 
as world leader in “mature” office products: printing calculators (30%), portable and 
professional typewriters (25%), and adding machines (20%). The company’s shares of the 
global market in these products, in the late ‘60s, appeared to be of absolute importance.  
The first goal the company set for itself was to make the American branch profitable 
again. The obsolete Hartford plant was closed in 1968 and its typewriter production 
transferred to the Scottish factory in Glasgow. Olivetti’s continuity on the American market 
was guaranteed by the construction of a new factory in Harrisburg (Pennsylvania) in 1969.  
In the short term, reorganizing the production structure around a line of mature office 
products made recovery possible and also generated solid market success. However, this 
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25decision reflected the absence of a strategic outlook, and an inability to grasp the long-term 
implications of micro-electronic innovation. This failure was a very serious one for a 
company open to international markets, and revealed a more generalized lack of preparation 
for the explosion of new technologies. Olivetti’s reorientation toward computers and office 
automation, which predominated after the early ‘70s, was for the most part the result of an 
adaptation dictated by the market and implemented with difficulty and delays by the 
company.
54 
The crisis that hit the company in the ‘70s led to a change in the production 
internationalization strategy. The strong development phase of the ‘50s and ‘60s was 
characterized by growth in protected markets, where commercial penetration required local 
industrial presence. Production was based on multi-product factories that could manufacture 
a wide product range and low product volumes, gauged to the size of individual national 
markets. In the late ‘70s a new phase of rationalizing production sites began; this facilitated 
the transition to an industrial structure based on mono-product factories. Global production 
of portable typewriters was concentrated in the Mexico City factory from 1982 to 1984, 
while the production lines for manual typewriters were transferred to San Paolo in 1979. In 
1980, a new factory was opened in Singapore to fill the demand for calculator production for 
the entire group. In the meantime, the crisis in the American branch was becoming 
increasingly severe: the American contribution to Olivetti’s sales had collapsed to less than 
10% of the total at the end of the ‘70s. This led to the closing of the Harrisburg plant in the 
summer of 1981.
55 
In 1978 a new management team took over, led by Carlo De Benedetti, during a period 
of corporate recapitalization and financial recovery. This marked the start of a new season of 
internationalization for Olivetti, based on renewed decentralization of the group’s 
multinational production. In addition, the strategy focused on a systematic search for any 
opportunity for commercial penetration in European and North American countries, and the 
development of technological interdependencies with new innovative companies that 
emerged in the international market subsequent to the microelectronic revolution. From 1980 
to 1996, Olivetti made 66 venture investments, including 19 companies that then went 
public, generating a net internal rate of return above 18%. 
In 1982 the attempt of solving the serious crisis of OCA culminated in the merger of 
the latter with Docutel, a leading ATM manufacturer. In 1984 the American 
telecommunications giant AT&T bought a 25% stake in Olivetti. On a technical/commercial 
level, the agreement stipulated that Olivetti would distribute AT&T products in Europe, 
while the latter agreed to buy approximately 250 million dollars worth (in 1984) of Olivetti 
products to be resold in the US. The agreement also made provisions for collaborating on 
new product development, trading manufacturing licences, and accessing research labs. In 
these exchanges between the two companies, the new Olivetti personal computer, the M24, 
took on a key role. This machine was sold in the US with the AT&T brand. By supplying its 
American partner over 200,000 units in 1986, Olivetti’s PC production reached nearly half a 
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26million units per year. This made the company the number three producer in the world, and 
number one in Europe.  
Nonetheless, all this was Olivetti’s swan song in the international market. Despite the 
positive sales results form the AT&T deal, the failure to integrate production between the 
two companies and the inadequate cooperation on new product development prevented 
Olivetti from competing in the IT sector at the same level as IBM and other market leaders. 
After Olivetti’s management refused to relinquish control of the company, the partnership 
was dissolved in 1989 with AT&T pulling out of its share capital.  
In the early ‘90s, Olivetti sunk into a deep profitability crisis, with rapid deterioration 
of its financial situation. A profound group-wide reorganization became necessary, which 
led to factory closures in Singapore, Spain and Brazil in 1996, and the sale of the personal 
computer business the following year. The company’s center of gravity shifted toward the 
Italian telecommunications market, with the creation of two new subsidiaries in the mid-
‘90s: Omnitel, a mobile telephone provider, and Infostrada, active in landline telephone 
service. In February 1999, Olivetti took control of Telecom Italia, via a mixed takeover bid. 
The deal was financed with Olivetti selling its Omnitel and Infostrada stock to the German 
company Mannesmann, and resorting to loans and capital increases. In 2003, Olivetti 
merged with Telecom Italia and the new company took the latter’s corporate name.  
4.2 SNIA  Viscosa 
The chemicals industry in Italy was created much later than in other major European 
countries. In fact, the vital stimulus which served to launch the sector came about only 
during World War I, with the temporary disappearance of international competition and the 
sharp rise in demand for explosives. The first Italian chemical company to attain extensive 
international reach, was SNIA (Società di Navigazione Italo-Americana). Founded by 
entrepreneur Riccardo Gualino in Turin in July of 1917, SNIA’s original business was 
transporting coal from the US. In 1918, SNIA acquired control of the International 
Shipbuilding Company, which owned two shipyards in Pascagoula (Mississippi) and in 
Texas. Then in 1919 SNIA bought stock in the Marine & Commerce Corp. of America, 
exporter of American coal to Italy.
56 In 1920 a serious crisis in the shipping business 
prompted top management to convert the company’s production to artificial textile fibers 
derived from cellulose, in particular rayon (or viscose). To reflect this new development, the 
company’s original name was changed to SNIA Societa’ di Navigazione Industria e 
Commercio, and again in 1922 to SNIA Viscosa (Società Nazionale Industria Applicazioni 
Viscosa). In the years to follow, SNIA Viscosa continued its expansion, taking over other 
Italian companies specialized in rayon production (Unione Italiane Fabbriche Viscosa, 
Viscosa di Pavia, Società Italiana Seta Artificiale). At the same time, the company achieved 
vertical integration by buying a majority stake in Rumianca, a producer of chemical 
compounds which were indispensable for manufacturing artificial threads, and SILM, a 
supplier of plant machinery and equipment needed to produce rayon.  
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27These investments enabled SNIA Viscosa to participate fully in the international 
expansion phase of new technology in artificial cellulose fibers. In the early years of the 
twentieth century until the outbreak of the Second World War, the production of chemical 
fibers grew notably, with market share progressively increasing with respect to natural 
fibers. In 1925 the quantity of artificial fibers produced by SNIA totalled 43,000 quintals a 
day, equalling 70.3% of Italian production, 16.6% of European production, and 11.3% of 
world production. Along with these results came other important accomplishments: SNIA 
became the Italian company with the largest share capital (one billion lire), and was also the 
first to be listed on foreign stock exchanges (London and New York). 
The Turinese group also sought to extend its field of action internationally, not only 
through exports, but also via direct penetration in foreign markets through the establishment 
of commercial and production branches. By the end of 1920, SNIA Viscosa had created two 
companies in the US, the Commercial Fibre Corporation and the Industrial Fibre 
Corporation of America; the latter was to launch rayon production in a factory built in 
Cleveland (Ohio).
57  
In 1925, thanks to intermediation by the Banca Commerciale Italiana, SNIA acquired 
majority shares in the Polish company Tomaszowska Fabrika. This investment gave SNIA 
two distinct advantages: first, the company was able to extend its market share in Poland 
while avoiding high customs duties, and second, it could exploit the factory’s strategic 
position in close proximity to the Russian market. Over the years, SNIA also opened 
business firms abroad, and owned as many as six in 1931.
58 However, SNIA’s golden age 
came quickly to an end. Mussolini’s monetary revaluation, which took effect in August of 
1926 (“Quota 90”), dealt a heavy blow to the company, which exported 80% of its turnover 
and imported only a minimal portion of raw materials (from 7 to 11% of the cost of 
production). 
SNIA had not yet recovered from the effects of “Quota 90” when it felt the 
repercussions of the crisis of 1929, which resulted in a sharp decrease in prices and profit 
margins. Since its entrance in the sector, the company’s primary focus was a commercial 
strategy based on low sales prices; consequently it had not adequately modernized its 
factories on a technological level. This necessitated investments in new machinery in order 
to cut production costs. In January 1930, Riccardo Gualino was forced to resign as president, 
and at that point new executives took over,
59 implementing a radical reorganization of the 
group in the first half of the ‘30s. 
The autarchic policies implemented by the Fascist regime in the second half of the ‘30s 
not only spurred domestic consumption of artificial textile fibers, but drove exports as well. 
In order to boost foreign sales of goods made of artificial fibers, a sizeable increase in export 
bonuses took effect in February 1934. SNIA diversified production when it began making 
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28viscose staple, a short fiber that could be used as a cotton substitute; in 1934-1935 the 
company became the world’s number one producer of this fiber. SNIA Viscosa also 
launched domestic production of cellulose, most of which had previously been imported.
60 
In this way, during the autarchy SNIA managed to increase production and exportation, 
while the percentage of the world’s total production realized by the group began to rise 
again, oscillating around 8% during this time. As regards the group’s foreign business, 
instead, exploiting the political affinity with the Franco regime in Spain, in the late ‘30s 
SNIACE was founded, a company headquartered in Madrid with production facilities in 
Torrelavega (Santander).
61 
After the Second World War, SNIA continued its foreign activities with direct 
investments concentrated in Third World countries, mainly Latin America. During the ‘50s 
and ‘60s, SNIA’s foreign production arm extended to other countries as well, India and 
Russia among them.
62 However, new investments appeared to be essentially defensive 
moves, all of which were motivated by the goal of substituting diminishing exports on 
European markets with larger market shares in developing countries. These were nations 
which implemented import substitution policies and kept tariff barriers high. As far as 
technology, the delays SNIA were accruing in this area were becoming more and more 
serious.
 63 
The Turinese group made its fortune from rayon, but by the late ‘50s this material had 
reached the apex of its commercial success, and was on the verge of a rapid decline due to 
the increasing popularity of synthetic fibers. In fact, in 1965 synthetic fiber production in 
Italy already exceeded 110,000 tons, while cellulose production showed the first signs of 
slowing: 191,000 tons compared to nearly 220,000 tons the previous year. The same year, 
SNIA recorded a 15.4% drop in sales of rayon thread, and a 21.1% decrease for staple, only 
partially compensated by an increase of 5.6% of synthetic fiber production.
64 Worldwide 
growth in this production continued until 1973, while cellulose production decreased in more 
industrialized Western countries. The 1973-1974 oil crisis triggered a similarly critical 
situation in the sector, exacerbated by a sizeable excess of production capacity accumulated 
over the previous years. From 1973 to 1975, SNIA’s sales plummeted by more than 40%, 
and the subsequent financial crisis ultimately moved the company into the orbit of 
Montedison, which acquired 30% stock in the Turinese group in 1974. In the years that 
followed, SNIA gradually began spinning off its activities in the fiber sector, including 
participation in foreign companies, and started diversifying its business in the sectors of 
chemical products, explosives, and arms. By the late ‘70s, turnover in the fiber sector 
accounted for only 40% of the total, and that figure was diminishing continually.  
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294.3 Montecatini/Montedison 
Montecatini was founded in 1888 to mine a copper deposit in Tuscany. The company 
entered the chemicals sector with a series of acquisitions undertaken from 1913 to 1920; 
Montecatini grew rapidly over the next two decades. The most significant industrial 
initiative involved the field of nitrogen-based fertilizers, with the creation in 1921 of a 
company which would exploit a process for production of synthetic nitrogen invented by 
Giacomo Fauser. This move, enabling Montecatini to bypass the technological monopoly 
created in this sector by Basf, marked the start of a large-scale development plan which led 
to the construction of five nitrogen fertilizer plants in Italy from 1925 to 1927. 
In 1926, building began on the first foreign factory (in Willebroek, Belgium) managed 
directly by Montecatini through the Belgian company SA Ammoniaque Synthétique et 
Dérivés (ASED). In January 1929, Montecatini founded the Compagnie Neerlandaise de 
l’Azote, headquartered in Brussels, with the aim of building a large synthetic ammonia and 
fertilizer plant in Sluiskil, a small village in the Dutch Flanders. The objective this time was 
not only entering the promising Dutch market, but also the opportunity to access world 
export markets thanks to the low production costs available in Holland. The Sluiskil plant 
began operations in November 1930, and until 30 June 1931 production was restricted by 
quotas set by an international nitrogen cartel, which Montecatini joined in summer 1930, in 
the interests of the Neerlandaise. In June 1932 a new international nitrogen cartel took over, 
lasting two years, and counting almost all the world’s producer countries as members. This 
cartel established a series of agreements setting prices and curtailing production. One of the 
key accords addressed compensating producers who agreed to limit production. The highest 
compensation was to be paid to Neerlandaise: 4.5 million gold marks per year in exchange 
for restricting Sluiskil annual production to 15,000 tons of nitrogen, 30% of the actual 
production capacity.
 65 For Montecatini, faced with a difficult financial situation in Italy due 
to the global crisis, the agreement also guaranteed protection of the Italian market by 
preventing other cartel members from exporting to this country. The accords with the 
International Nitrogen Cartel remained in effect until the outbreak of World War II, and 
marked the end of Montecatini’s internationalization process, for all intents and purposes.  
In the early ‘50s, Montecatini successfully led the way into the new era of 
petrochemicals by financing research conducted by Giulio Natta. This work led to the 
discovery in 1953 of a new thermoplastic polymer, isotactic polypropylene, for which 
production was launched on an industrial scale in 1957 in Montecatini’s Ferrara plant. 
Natta’s discovery gave rise to opportunities for the company to develop new initiatives in the 
field of plastic materials and synthetic fibers, based on owned technology and not depending 
exclusively on buying licenses or patents.
66 In the second half of ‘50 Montecatini decided to 
explore again the possibility of multinational expansion with the aim of fully exploiting the 
technical capabilities and know how gleaned from industrial processes patented by Fauser 
and from Natta’s more recent discoveries.  
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30In 1955, after having explored the opportunities that various national markets offered, 
Montecatini management opted to build a chemical plant in the US for the production of 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and eventually production of plastic materials with the technology 
being developed by Natta’s research team. The most noteworthy factor about this initiative 
was that there was very little economic motivation behind the decision to invest in the US, 
the most sophisticated market in the world. Instead, building a direct production hub in 
America was a prerequisite for listing Montecatini on the New York Stock Exchange, and 
facilitating the extension of the company’s patents to encompass the United States.
67 
Despite the reduced size, the new company, called Novamont had a turbulent existence 
from the outset. In 1959, after putting the investment plan on hold for two years, Montecatini 
approved the issuance of a 20-year bond worth 10 million dollars on the US market. The 
cash raised by this move was used to build a plant for isotactic polypropylene production and 
other petrochemical products, abandoning the original project of producing PVC. A plant in 
Neal (West Virginia) was opened in October 1961, and its production capacity was doubled 
from 1965 to 1967. Nonetheless, Novamont began almost immediately to encounter serious 
difficulties in commercializing polypropylene, due for the most part to Montecatini’s 
extremely frail US sales network, and a series of industrial problems. One such problem was 
the failed attempt to secure patents, and the consequent bitter competition from local 
companies such as Hercules and Standard Oil, which were able to introduce process 
innovations that seriously damaged Montecatini’s position on the American market.
68 
The establishment of Novamont, therefore, proved tantamount to “beating a hasty 
advance.” Despite the unquestionable capacity for innovation, demonstrated with the 
development of propylene, a number of factors signalled that the company was 
fundamentally ill-prepared to move forward on its own with a direct investment strategy in 
intensely competitive markets: indecision regarding production options, financial difficulties 
and an inadequate commercial network.
69 Nevertheless Montecatini did have some degree of 
success with its other direct investment in the early ‘60s: the establishment of Paular in 
Spain, in a joint venture with the public conglomerate INI, for the production of 
polypropylene for the Spanish market.
70  
The strategy for expanding into petrochemicals, initiated after World War II, called for 
major investments which gradually increased as the company transitioned from the research 
phase to pilot plants and then commercial production. The petrochemicals expansion 
strategy pushed Montecatini beyond the limits of its managerial and financial capabilities, to 
the point where in the mid-‘60s the company was forced to tap external resources, both 
industrial and financial.
71 In doing so, Montecatini embarked on two major initiatives in 
1964: absorbing the former electric company Sade, which brought in large sums of fresh 
capital from the State with the nationalization of the electric sector; and setting up a joint 
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31venture with Shell. Monteshell, as the new company was called, was conceived as the means 
for overcoming the Italian group’s obvious operating limits. 
Monteshell took over the Ferrara and Brindisi petrochemicals plants; the Anglo-Dutch 
group contributed technological know-how and market expertise, capital and new 
management techniques. However, the partnership did not last long, because it became 
immediately apparent that the two companies had managerial and technical routines that 
were far too different to allow them to work together. After this initiative failed, 
Montecatini’s new goal was to merge with Edison, that was finally realized in 1966.  
Unfortunately the merger of Montecatini and Edison, which was supposed to resolve 
the “chemical war” at home and create an internationally competitive Italian champion, did 
not live up to the expectations.
72 The impressive size of the new company, which in 1969 
took the name Montedison, made it the tenth largest group in the world in terms of turnover 
in the chemicals industry. This meant the company enjoyed a fairly prominent position in 
international rankings, but only in basic chemicals and derivatives, while in the sectors of 
fine chemicals and special chemicals, the company had little or no business at all. 
Another serious weakness of the Italian company was a much lower level of 
internationalization, as compared to key competitors, and consequently a greater dependency 
on the domestic market. Despite an established commercial presence in 20 countries, in 1968 
the company’s foreign turnover accounted for 36.3% of the total (88% of this was realized in 
Europe); of this percentage, 81% was exported from Italy and 19% was produced by foreign 
subsidiaries. This last figure, therefore, corresponded in absolute terms to only 6.8% of the 
group’s global turnover, little more than half the average value compared to the major 
German companies (Basf, Bayer, and Hoechst) and a great deal less than the 32.5% of the 
English company ICI and the 33.6% of the French company Rhône Poulenc.
73 Moreover, the 
new company had been founded without any clear internationalization strategy, merging two 
companies with serious financial and industrial problems
74.  
The crisis at Montedison intensified throughout the ‘70s, accompanied by further 
retreat from foreign markets. Only in the early ‘80s did the financial situation improve 
perceptibly, when the long painful reorganization process, begun in the late ‘60s, was 
complete.
75 The most prominent casualties of this process were the group’s major foreign 
subsidiaries (Novamont, Paular and Compagnie Neerlandaise de l’Azote), sold in 1979. The 
sale of Novamont sealed Montedison’s abandonment of its plan to win a significant share of 
the American market, a strategy it had pursued through the investments made in previous 
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32years. This occurred just when this same market was attracting more and more attention and 
investments from the major European chemicals groups.
76 
In the early ‘80s, Montedison fielded a new internationalization strategy based on 
alliance building with foreign firms. Accordingly, in 1983 Montedison set up a joint venture 
with Hercules and founded Himont, the undisputed leader in Europe and the US in the 
polypropylene sector.
77 Himont was the group’s most important foreign subsidiary by far 
with 1,000 employees and turnover of nearly 500 million dollars. Collaboration with 
established foreign companies, along with enormous investments in new technological 
competencies, finally seemed to open the door to internationalization for the Italian 
chemicals giant. Montedison attempted a similar approach in the pharmaceutical sector and 
in fine chemical products by creating a holding, Erbamont, listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange in June 1983. In this case, internationalization was promoted through cross-
licensing agreements with major international competitors, and with investments targeting 
the acquisition of pharmaceutical research and development facilities, located primarily in 
the United States.
78 
In 1985, Ausimont, the Montedison subsidiary active in the production of special 
plastics, merged with the American company Compo Industries, becoming one of the largest 
international producers of fine chemical products. Montecatini achieved a greater 
concentration in its core business after the reorganizations of the ‘70s; this enabled the 
company to lay the foundations for raising the level of group internationalization. In fact, 
foreign turnover rose from 35% in 1983 to more than 40% in 1986, while the portion of 
production realized abroad increased from around 7% to 16% in 1985. 
In the mid-‘80s, however, the group’s improved international reach was not enough to 
enable it to rebalance its financial situation, which was a precarious one due to chronic 
undercapitalization and the heavy investments of previous years. Instead of reorganizing the 
chemicals business more extensively, management pursued an aggressive growth strategy, 
backed by major leveraging.
79  
In 1986 Montedison was the target of a takeover bid by the agro-chemical group 
Ferruzzi; this move further exacerbated the company’s financial position. To avoid 
bankruptcy, Montedison ended up creating a joint venture with Eni, merging the basic 
chemicals production of the two companies. The new firm, initially called Enimont, was 
renamed Enichem in 1991 after Eni bought the remaining Montedison stock. During the ‘90s 
Montedison progressively abandoned the chemicals industry, and reconverted into an energy 
company. In order to finance this transformation, in the late ‘90s Himont was sold first to a 
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33joint venture with Shell (Montell) and later to the newly-established Basell, which united the 
plastics production of Shell and Basf. 
5.  New protagonists 
Besides old protagonists and “one season protagonists,” we now focus on the still 
small but recently fast growing group of medium-size companies that in the last decades 
made the transition from purely exporters to new multinationals.  
Despite being latecomers, Italian multinationals have been able to start growing since 
the mid-1980s, more in terms of a broadening group of international investors (extensive 
margin) than through an increased size of the few companies inherited from the past 
decades. The balance has heavily shifted in favour of mid-size “fourth capitalism.” As 
already recalled at the end of Sect. 2, in the last two decades, half of large and very large 
groups have disappeared or have been replaced, as well as one third of the medium-large 
ones. Moreover today one third of the top Italian multinationals are non manufacturing 
investors (bank-insurance-energy-telecom services).  
Some of these latecomers had been founded back in the XIX century (Marzotto, 
Italcementi, Piaggio), some others in the first half of the XX century (Zegna, Indesit, 
Danieli, GD-Coesia, Sacmi, Recordati, Bracco), but their true multinational expansion took 
place much later in the last decades of the XX century. This is why we have included them 
among “new protagonists.” 
They all share some characteristics that are typical of the Italian “fourth capitalism” of 
medium-small and medium-large firms. The size of their turnover: a) €500-1000 million for 
specialized suppliers of mechanical equipment and components (such as Carraro, IMA, 
Coesia, Brembo, SACMI, Manuli) and medium-high tech pharmaceutical producers (such as 
Menarini, Recordati, Zambon, Bracco, Dompé); b) in the range of €1000-2000 million for 
producers of motorvehicles and components (Piaggio), construction materials (Mapei, 
Permasteelisa) and plastics (Mossi&Ghisolfi); c) up to €4000 million and beyond for some 
groups supplying both large scale intermediate products (steel, cement) and specialized 
engineering (Riva, Danieli, Italcementi) as well as fashion and food producers selling in the 
mass market (such as Luxottica, Ferrero, Parmalat, Perfetti, Lavazza). On average their size 
is far below their major American and European competitors, which implies less ability to 
enter and steadily position themselves in distant large fast-growing markets like China, 
India, Brazil.  
They are all family firms with a strong external managerial involvement. There are few 
examples of cooperative organizations that have grown multinationals in recent years 
(SACMI, CMC). Their business is focused on relatively small market niches, with a high 
diversification within the same niche (in medium and high consumer market segments) and a 
genuine propensity and ability to customize their product for sophisticated users (in all 
equipment and components for producer durable goods).  
Their motivation to become multinationals (not only strong exporters) is 
predominantly “market seeking,” only occasionally “cost saving” (e.g. Benetton, Miroglio, 
Italcementi, Buzzi Unicem, Riva, De Longhi), sometimes “knowledge resource seeking” 
(e.g. Recordati, Dompé, Bracco, Datalogic, STMicroelectronis, Mapei). Their mode of 
multinational expansion is predominantly based on greenfields, although M&A strategies 
34have often played an increasing role in more recent years, following their consolidation as 
multinational players. 
Manufacturing abroad is of course a central feature, sometimes aimed at being in the 
physical proximity to large downstream customers (e.g. Brembo, Sacmi, Carraro) but a 
crucial element of their multinational growth almost always is also a strong investment in the 
downstream phases of the supply chain. This holds for both proprietary distributive networks 
of retail shops (for fashion companies such as Zegna, Armani, Bulgari, Ferragamo, Benetton, 
Marzotto, Luxottica, Geox) and for the extended network of affiliates for sale and technical 
after sale assistance (for all producers of consumer durables, equipment and components 
such as Indesit, De Longhi, Danieli, Piaggio, Coesia, STMicroelecronics, Datalogic). 
In almost half of the cases these companies still keep solid roots in their original 
“industrial district” area, although the range of their specialized suppliers has expanded 
much beyond the district itself.  
The most technology-oriented among them are quite keen on networking with Italian 
and foreign Polytechnics and science research University departments, investing in R&D 
significant shares of their turnover (up to 5-10%). 
Their financial structure tends to be quite solid, as a result of relatively small leverage 
and low dependence on bank credit. 
Finally one should also mention two very special cases of recent big protagonists of 
the Italian multinational growth, both belonging to the area of listed companies still today 
under State majority control: Finmeccanica and ENI. Finmeccanica’s international activity 
has indeed been characterized mainly by production sharing agreements with American and 
European governments in the field of defense (Alenia Aeronautica, Alenia Aermacchi, Oto 
Melara, Agusta Westland, Selex Galileo, Selex System Integration) and of rail transport and 
power generation (Ansaldo Breda, Ansaldo Sts, Ansaldo Energia).
80 ENI has been privatized 
for about 70% of equity capital but still operates under close control by the Italian Treasury. 
ENI’s strongest multinational presence is in the area of oil&gas exploration, extraction and 
refinery (AGIP), as well as in engineering and construction (Snamprogetti, Saipem).
81 
The following 6 very short case histories (3 in clothing and fashion, 2 in chemicals, 1 
in vehicle industries) are the first examples of some medium and medium-large 
multinational companies belonging to the postwar Italian “fourth capitalism,” chosen for 
being significantly different in terms of sector, size, age, pattern of growth, motivation for 
becoming multinationals. 
                                                           
80 For  an extensive treatment of the whole history of Finmeccanica see Zamagni (2009). A short picture of 
recent acquisitions and agreements is in Mariotti-Mutinelli (2010, p. 172-179).  
81 Mariotti-Mutinelli (2010, p. 169-172). 
355.1  Textile – Apparel - Fashion 
5.1.1 Ermenegildo  Zegna 
This is a peculiar example of a large size, luxury and high fashion producer (unlike 
Miroglio and Benetton in textile-apparel, Marzotto being in medium-high segment), born in 
a typical Italian old high quality textile district (Biella), in the NorthWest of Italy, with a 
strongly consolidated international network, mainly distributive but cautiously matched with 
few focused productive units and suppliers abroad (far less than Benetton and Miroglio). 
  In 1919 the 18-years old Ermenegildo Zegna (EZ), taking over from his father 
Michelangelo’s small textile business, set the basis of what after a few years became the 
Lanificio Ermenegildo Zegna (wool mill) in the mountain village of Trivero (Biella). Since 
the beginning EZ chose to compete with the best cloth producers of the time (British), 
buying the most updated machinery, training his skilled personnel and selecting suppliers of 
best quality cashmere wool from Australia-Argentina-South Africa. EZ was the first Italian 
weaver to brand and advertise his fabrics. In 1945 the EZ clothes were already exported in 
more than 45 countries. 
At the beginning of the 1960s the company had 1400 employees and a turnover of 
about €4 million. Euros, only about 6% from exports. Then the company started a 
downstream vertical diversification into knitwear, men’s suits and clothing, setting up 
several commercial offices in the major developed markets within and outside Europe.  
In the 1970s Zegna opened clothing production facilities in Spain (1973) and 
Switzerland (1977).
82  
Since the mid-1970s Zegna started to strengthen its international distribution network, 
entering the world’s high-end department stores and retailers (e.g. Neiman Markus and 
Barney’s in USA). A major innovative step was when the first Ermenegildo Zegna owned 
store opened in Paris, soon followed by many others in major international capitals Milano, 
London, New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo and many others. In 1984 the Ermenegildo Zegna 
Group had 2500 employees and a turnover of €50 million. Euros, 60% coming from exports.  
The third generation (cousins Gildo and Paolo, currently Ceo and president) pursued 
the product diversification and expansion (Z Zegna line, Sport line, leather goods and 
accessories, luxury sportwear, licensed goods). Specific production units were settled in joint 
venture with partners, such as Ferragamo for shoes and leather goods. Business relationships 
were also established with top designers and luxury companies such as Giorgio Armani, 
Gianni Versace, Gucci, Tom Ford to produce and/or distribute their menswear products. A 
team of about 50 young designers stimulates creativity and innovation. A persistent search of 
cutting-edge technologies (e.g. chemical-free dyeing processes, special garments able to give 
                                                           
82 The Spanish initiative was mainly motivated by penetrating a highly protected market (“tariff  jumping”), 
while the Swiss plant was devoted to the highly innovative “made to measure clothing” targeted to provide 
high quality personalized garments to customers. Higher Swiss nominal wages were offset by lower social 
contributions and higher productivity, with a contribution of Italian cross-border skilled workers. 
 
36a cooling effect by deflecting sun rays) contributes to pursue quality improvements that 
combine elegance with comfort. Lanerie Agnona, a luxury small women textile and apparel 
company, was purchased in 1999 to test the potentiality of the ladies market. In addition new 
productive facilities were started in Mexico and Turkey. The distribution network strongly 
expanded in China (where EZ is today market leader with more than 60 fully owned stores 
and additional 30 franchised in more than 25 cities), Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Australia, Brazil. China’s sales already exceed sales in US and Italy. Eastern 
Europe, Middle East and Latin America have also seen a fast growing number of Zegna 
owned and franchised shops. Zegna recently entered a deal with part of the India’s Reliance 
Group 
In 2009 Zegna had more than 7500 employees (still 500 in Trivero, against 1400 in 
1970), a turnover of €797 million. Euros of which 90% originated abroad, 550 exclusive 
stores of which 56% directly owned.  
5.1.2 Benetton 
Benetton is perhaps the most widely known brand in the world in the segment of 
Italian affordable fashion. It is also an interesting case of internationalization strategy 
initially based upon a widespread exclusive distribution-only system (as Zegna), but 
subsequently morphed into a mix of international production (including in-sourcing from 
foreign affiliates) and outsourcing from local suppliers (unlike Zegna). 
After the death of his father at the end of the second world war, Luciano Benetton first 
worked in a clothing store in Ponzano Veneto (small town 30 km. north of Venice), then 
started a small business with his younger brothers Carlo and Gilberto and sister Giuliana, 
producing sweaters in bright unconventional colors and selling them door to door. In 1965 
they formed the Benetton Group. Three years later the first innovative store (same room for 
displaying selling and stocking the products, wide range of bright colors and affordable 
prices) was opened in Belluno, then in Paris in 1968 and soon in other major European 
cities.  
In 1969 the first apparel line for children was started. During the 1970s Benetton went 
into a broader range of items, producing and selling jeans, trousers, shirts and T-shirts for all 
ages. By 1978 there were more than 200 Benetton stores across Europe and the Group was 
reorganized as a limited liability company. By the early 1980s Benetton was opening on 
average one store a day, including major hits such as New York (1980) and Tokyo (1982). 
At that time production was distributed among nine factories in Italy, France and Scotland. 
Since 1984 the campaign “All the colors of the world” (later relabeled “United colors of 
Benetton”) became the central advertising instrument. The Benetton International Holding 
was headquartered in Luxembourg in 1985, company’s shares were listed on the Milano 
stock exchange in 1986, followed by listing in Frankfurt (1988) and New York (1989). 
 By the mid-1980s Benetton was present through 3200 exclusive shops in about 60 
countries. By the mid-1990s sales in over 100 countries were above US$ 1.5 billions. Today 
Benetton sales originate from 6300 shops, 900 directly operated, in over 120 countries. 
  Today net revenues (€2049 million in 2009, €891 million in 1
st semester 2010) 
originate 80% from wholesale business and 20% from direct sales. Geographical sale 
37composition is (2009) 48% Italy, 34% Europe (incl. CEE and Russia), 14% Asia, 3% 
Americas, 1% ROW.
83  
Creativity and innovation is strongly emphasized with the help of 300 designers 
coming from several countries and travelling around the world in search of ideas and trends. 
About €30 million (1.5% of sales) go to R&D expenditures on new materials (e.g. very light 
cachemere at affordable prices), spinning-weaving and dyeing technologies, CAD 
techniques, occasionally in partnership with multinational companies and Universities. 
Fabrica, a peculiar multicultural research center started in 1994 and located near Treviso, 
hosts every year young people coming from all over the world to interact with designers, 
experts of social and cultural communication, photographers, musicians, artists and 
publishers. 
Up until the early 2000s, Benetton’s retail was entirely based upon a peculiar licensor-
licensee relationship channeled through more than 80 agents.
84 This system became 
increasingly unsuitable to manage the changing “fast fashion” trend, very popular among 
young generations who were better served by competitors such as Zara and H&M, owning 
their shops and offering trendy design at affordable prices in 12 collections a year (as against 
the 2 collections by Benetton at comparably higher prices). Franchisees became increasingly 
unhappy about their earnings and Benetton felt a decline in margins profitability. Moreover 
the division Benetton Sportsystem (rollerblades, sky, snowshoes etc.) turned out to be a 
failure, causing a forced sale and write-off of €190 million in 2002.  
And in 2003 moved quickly to a much more flexible “dual supply chain,” aiming at 
ensuring an almost “continuous collection” with fast adaptation to changing market 
sentiments and trends, time to market and quick delivery as well as quality control. One 
(sequential) chain from design to R&D to operations to sales is matched by the other 
(integrated) chain, which maximizes the speed of coordinated interconnections between 
these basic stages of the production and distribution process. Five kinds of collections stretch 
from an extreme of 6-8 months before the season to the other extreme of 1-2 weeks before 
the season. 
Benetton trademark is licensed to third producers in related fields such as eyewear, 
travel bags, stationery, perfumes, household goods. 
Coming to the manufacturing organization, production is performed today in ten 
factories located in Italy and nine other factories in Croatia, Tunisia, Romania, Hungary and 
India. The most important foreign affiliate is in Tunisia, which operates with 700 direct 
employees and 1200 indirect external workforce reporting to 160 “terzisti.” They operate 
both with vertically integrated processes and through outsourcing of labour intensive tasks 
                                                           
83 Major brands are United Colors of Benetton (casual), Sisley (glamour), both for adults and children with a 
clear identity of Italian creativity-good quality-affordable price and a wide range of clothing and accessories. A 
tiny share of sales (2%) comes from the brand Playlife (experimental). 
84 Agents were paid a commission of around 4% of total sales in their region, supervised by seven area 
managers. The store owners entered agreements with agents, without any written contract with Benetton. There 
was no license fee or royalty paid by franchisees, but they were committed to stock and sell only items supplied 
by Benetton, who operated on a no-return basis, upon orders from agents about eight months in advance. 
38(like stitching, finishing, ironing), while more strategic tasks (like cutting, weaving, dyeing, 
quality control, logistics) are kept within own factories.
85 Logistics has traditionally been a 
crucial function within Benetton’s approach to production and distribution planning.
86  
5.1.3 Luxottica 
Luxottica Group, perhaps the best known trademark in fashion accessories, is today 
world leader in the premium fashion, luxury and sports eyewear, selling almost 20 million 
prescription frames and more than 35 million sunglasses in about 6400 different styles. 
Design and production are concentrated in 6 plants in Italy, 2 plants in China, one in India 
and two sport sunglass production in the USA. Sales are generated by a wholesale business, 
covering 130 countries across five continents, and by a retail division which counts more 
than 6300 stores in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, South Africa and the Middle East.  
Total direct employment, mainly in distribution, amounts to about 60.000 employees. 
The combined size of its main Italian competitors (Safilo, DeRigo, Marcolin) is  less than 
half the size of Luxottica sales (€5.1 billion in 2009).
87 
Still today Luxottica is strictly controlled by its founder Leonardo Del Vecchio (born 
1935), but management is fully under the responsibility of CEO Andrea Guerra, who a few 
years ago moved from a similar position in Indesit. Thus Luxottica could be taken as an 
interesting example of a truly “family-managerial” firm.  
Leonardo Del Vecchio in the 1950s started as craftsman in metal engravings and 
medals and stencils, as well as dies and small metal components for companies in various 
sectors, including eyewear. In 1961 Metalflex, a Cadore-based manufacturer of frames for 
eyeglasses and one of Del Vecchio’s customers, called him to join as shareholder of a new 
plant in Agordo (Belluno province), where the eyewear industry was concentrated. 
Production of complete eyewear started in 1967 and Del Vecchio was keen on putting 
emphasis on technological improvement. Soon Del Vecchio was able to buy out the other 
shareholders and upgrade from sub-supplier to integrated manufacturer under the new 
Luxottica brand, whose first collection was presented in 1971. Initially Luxottica positioned 
itself in the mid-range market segment, where the price-quality ratio was rapidly winning 
over its German and French competitors.  
                                                           
85 Outsourcing includes many Central-Eastern European suppliers (including ones from Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Ukraine, Moldavia, Serbia) and has been recently directed to more than 200 contracting and 
subcontracting Asian suppliers from China (coordinated from Hong Kong), India (coordinated from Bangalore) 
and East Asian countries like Thailand-Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam-Indonesia (coordinated from Bangkok). 
Today about 450% of production is done by third parties suppliers. Wool, cotton and other raw materials are 
purchased by about 180 suppliers worldwide. 
86 A fully robotized logistics center in Castrette (Italy), built on 30.000 square meters with a 1 km. long tunnel 
and electromagnetic propulsion of pallets, has a total capacity of 800.000 boxes and is able to move 120.000 
incoming and outcoming boxes a day, operated by only 28 people. This center works with two hubs in Shenzen 
and Mexico City, respectively for Asian and American markets. 
87 Proprietary brands are Ray-Ban, Oakley, Persol and others, while brands under license include Bulgari, 
Ferragamo, Prada, Versace, Dolce&Gabbana, Burberry, Chanel, Donna Karan, Polo Ralph Lauren and Tiffany. 
Retail brands include LensCrafters in North America and China, OPSM in Australia and Sunglass Hut globally. 
39Since the early 1970s Luxottica’s distribution strategy was targeted to vertical 
integration and to direct marketing; international expansion began in the 1980s, with 
acquisition of distributors, opening of branches and joint ventures. In 1981 Luxottica 
established its first commercial subsidiary in Germany and in the mid-80s it acquired Avant-
garde Optics, its exclusive distributor in the USA. At the end of the decade exports already 
absorbed 85% of the production. 
 As the eyewear market increasingly became a market for fashion accessories, also due 
to technological improvements in combining metals and plastics, Luxottica’s 
internationalization strategy was firmly based on: a) emphasis on highly diversified and 
sophisticated styling through licensing of top fashion brands; b) production efficiency and 
quality control through six integrated production plants equipped with CAD-CAM systems 
and carefully tested by close cooperation with machinery suppliers mainly located in the 
nearby district area; c) listing on the New York Stock Exchange (1990) followed by Milano 
Stock Exchange (2000) which allowed an aggressive strategy of investment and license 
acquisition while maintaining full control on the family business and a solid financial 
structure; d) full customer service through increasing reliance on direct wholesale and retail 
distribution networks supplanting wholesalers.
88  
Following the acquisition in 1995 of Lens Crafters, the largest optical retail chain in 
the world, and in 1999 of the ailing eyewear division of Bausch & Lomb (holding a 
proprietary portfolio of brands such as Ray-Ban, the world’s best known sunglass brand, 
Revo, Arnette and others) Luxottica achieved a remarkably dominant position on the rich 
American market.
89 The international expansion of Luxottica went on in the 2000s through 
the acquisition in 2001 of Sunglass Hut, the world leading sun specialty stores chain, and in 
2007 of the iconic sport brand Oakley. 
The most advanced Luxottica “concept store” is a large open “eye hub” (a pilot project 
has been implemented in Australia) where clients may find not only wide display of models, 
but in addition consultancy by optometrist technicians, advanced sight measurement 
equipment, simulators for sunny and windy weather conditions, corners specialized in luxury 
sport eyewear, children relax areas. 
As in many other cases, the choice to setup production facilities in China reflects a 
market penetration target (fast growing local and broader Asian markets) more than a pure 
cost-saving strategy (advanced automation greatly reduces the share of labour costs, and in 
                                                           
88 The latter concern echoes the same evolution that was mentioned in the Benetton case and is well 
summarized by the following quotation of Del Vecchio himself (Brunetti-Negro 2004, p. 5): “Wholesalers are 
barriers because they only sell your product if it’s worthwhile for them but then they are free to sell other 
products […] a good wholesaler never puts all his eggs in one basket with  single supplier […] the next day he 
finds an even better product then he’ll abandon you and you lose the market.” 
89 Soon after came the shutting down of American plants (including some outsourcing to a Mexican facility), 
following crash tests that found eyewear produced in America having a resistance of around 20 hours compared 
to 80 hours of normal Luxottica eyewear. 
 
40addition technicians and foremen skills are not abundantly available in China). The number 
of retail shops in China is planned to grow from 240 today to about 500 within 2013.  
5.2 Chemicals   
5.2.1 Mossi&Ghisolfi 
This is the story of today’s largest size private Italian chemical engineering company, 
grown up through tentative alliances and skill spillovers from bigger producers, strongly 
oriented to R&D intensive plastic products and technologies for niche markets in mass 
consumption, capable to manage a fast multinational growth. 
Today M&G is the largest world’s producer of PET resins for container packaging, 
PET packaging films for food market (with a capacity planned to exceed 2.5 tons/year after a 
newly announced North American investments), as well as a major producer of polyester 
fibers for the textile industry. Its turnover has reached US$ 2.5 billion (80% PET, 75% from 
outside Italy) with more than 3000 employees. 
Its directly operated plants are located in Italy, Brazil, Mexico and the USA. R&D 
facilities are located in Rivalta (Italy), Sharon Center (Ohio, USA) and Pocos de Caldas 
(Brazil). M&G is committed to environmental sustainability, including the promotion of 
recycling activities. 
Back in the 1950s the Italian chemical industry was already lagging behind the main 
European and American competitors in catching up with the increasing domestic and 
international demand of synthetic chemicals such as resins, fibers and plastics. About two 
thirds of Montecatini’s turnover came from agrochemicals (fertilizers etc.). Major American 
and European groups, fully equipped to serve this booming demand, entered the Italian 
market, exporting but also opening Italian subsidiaries and affiliates in chemical and 
pharmaceutical sectors. 
Mossi&Ghisolfi (M&G) was born as a family business in Tortona (low Piedmont) in 
1953, led by today CEO Vittorio Ghisolfi (Mossi is his wife’s name), as supplier of plastic 
containers for pharma, soon extended to containers for detergents, cosmetics and similar 
home and personal products, using as input imported polietilene. In early 1960s the leading 
private chemical producer Montecatini was strongly hit by the failure of the attempted joint 
venture (Himont) with Occidental’s Mr. Hammer in entering the American market, as well 
as by persistent technological and financial hardships generated by its big Brindisi’s 
propylene plant. Then M&G was given the opportunity to open a 50-50 joint venture with 
Montecatini to develop plants for containers in high-density poliethylene (HDPE), soon 
becoming the largest Italian producer of multipurpose plastic materials. Subsequent joint 
ventures, first with Shell Chemical, then with Edison soon before the merger Montedison, 
were unsuccessful. Thus in 1973 the M&G joint venture with Montedison was dismissed. 
The turmoil caused by the first oil crisis (1973) brought about a heavy crisis 
throughout the large-size Italian chemical industry (unlike the reaction of its main European 
competitors), thus triggering a heavy State intervention through loss-covering subsidies and 
nationalizations (SIR and Liquichimica plants absorbed by ENI-AGIP). In this context M&G 
rediscovered its potential as family business, leader in plastic bottles for home products. But 
a crucial step was a strong R&D effort which led to the original development a new 
41polyester resin (PET), suitable for food uses and in particular for the very fast growing 
market of plastic bottles of mineral water, starting from a DuPont patent of a bio-oriented 
polyester. During the 1980s and 1990s a careful planning of increasing capacity in highly 
specialized plants, together with heavy R&D expenditures and hiring of many researchers 
and technicians (spillover from the failing Italian big public and private chemical groups), 
allowed M&G to become a world leading producer in this booming plastics world market 
(1/3 of the world capacity for PET in 2000). M&G also became leading provider of plants 
and related engineering services for this highly specialized production (e.g. supplying Shell’s 
PET plants in UK and Mexico).  
Starting in 2000, M&G goes through a rapid full internationalization process, first 
buying all Shell PET plants in Italy-UK-US-Mexico, then taking over additional PET 
production plants from the French Rhodia and an American subsidiary of Mitsubishi for 
chemical and petrochemical plant engineering (Chemtex) with important sub-affiliates in 
China and India. In 2007 M&G inaugurated the biggest PET plant (450.000 tons/year) in 
Ipojuca (State of Pernambuco, North Eastern Brazil), today expanded to 650.000 tons/year. 
5.2.2 Mapei 
Like Mossi&Ghisolfi, Mapei can be classified as an outstanding example of Italian 
multinational world leader in highly specialized niches of chemical engineering, namely 
adhesives and intermediates for construction materials.  
In 1937 Rodolfo Squinzi opened a small shop (3 employees) producing varnishes and 
plasters for buildings. Soon after WWII he specialized in floor fitting of different materials 
(linoleum, PVC, ceramics, wood). The company took off in the 1960s, under pressure of the 
booming production of Italian ceramics (Sassuolo district), and since the early 1970s his son 
Giorgio (newly graduated in Industrial Chemistry) has been leading the family firm along a 
fast domestic and international expansion. A greenfield plant in Canada in 1978, aimed at 
penetrating the huge North American market, triggered a strategy of rapid multinational 
growth. The labour force rose from 688 in 1993 to 3500 in 2003 to today’s 7000 employees, 
operating in 65 affiliates with 57 plants in 26 countries over the five continents ( 9 in Italy). 
The last decade alone saw an addition of 48 units as a combination of greenfields and 
acquisitions.  
Mapei keeps being supplier of building materials and technical assistance in important 
world projects: from the Sky Train bridge in Vancouver and airports in Brussels and Dubai 
to the Petronas towers in Kuala Lumpur, the Sidney Olympic pools and the 2010 Shanghai 
Expo. 
The multinational penetration of the Far East markets started in the mid-90s with the 
Singapore plant, followed during the years 2000 by operating plants and commercial 
subsidiaries in Malaysia and Vietnam, as well as by the entry in important building projects 
in Mainland China (first the three Gorges Dam) through Mapei subsidiaries in Hong Kong, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. 
Mapei is today second to M&G in terms of turnover (€1.5 billion in 2009) but much 
larger in terms of direct employees worldwide.  
The impressive size of direct employment largely reflects the market niche in which 
Mapei operates as a provider of some 1300 very specific, often customized products (elastic 
42sealants, resin floor coverings, mortars, additives for concrete, products for acoustic and 
thermal insulation, intermediate polymers etc.) whose design and production needs a 
proximate link with the users, in order to adjust to quite diversified exogenous conditions 
(climate, building materials, local standards and so on), transport costs and delivery times, 
besides providing a close technical assistance. Some plants, such as the ones taken over 
through the acquisition of the Italian Vinavil from Enichem in 1994, play a pivotal role as 
suppliers of upstream intermediates. Logistics is a crucial ingredient for ensuring an efficient 
networking within the group and competitive delivery times to the final customers.  
Despite a positioning within an apparently low-tech sector (construction materials), 
Mapei’s success greatly stems from a continuous consistent effort to innovate: R&D 
expenditures absorb 5% of the annual turnover and 12% of overall employment, through 10 
central laboratories (3 in Italy, 3 in Europe, 3 in USA, 1 in Canada) and 56 quality control 
centres.  
To some extent Mapei may be called a “forced multinational,” since the pure exporting 
activity cannot fit into those prerequisites for doing business on a worldwide basis. In 
addition Giorgio Squinzi’s type of management has always kept the profile of a peculiar mix 
of genuine family culture (strong interpersonal links) and multinational complex 
organization. Another quite not-so-common feature of Mapei has always been a consistent 
growth strategy through yearly retained earnings, with only limited temporary recourse to 
leverage (bank lending) for financing major acquisitions, no enlargement of equity capital 
and therefore no listing in any stock exchange market, no complex international financial 
structure: just the opposite to the standard big public company. The successful outcome as a 
leading mid-size multinational is partly explained by its highly focused market niches, far 
from traditional business diversification. 
5.3  Motor vehicles and components 
5.3.1 Piaggio 
The Vespa scooter is still today a successful example of Italian industrial design and 
creativity. Besides the 100.000 Vespa scooters, the range of 607.700 vehicles sold in 2009 
worldwide by Piaggio & C included more than 300.000 two wheel motorcycles from 50 to 
1200 cc with brands Piaggio, Gilera, Moto Guzzi, Derbi, Scarabeo, as well as almost 
200.000 light transport 3-4 wheels commercial vehicles whose most important brand is Ape. 
The Group operates through plants in Italy, Spain (Barcelona), India (Baramati), Vietnam 
(Vinh Phuc) and 5 R&D centres with about 700 researchers and technicians located in Italy, 
Spain, India and China. On the whole the group’s workforce is around 7000 employees. In 
addition it manages a minority (45%) joint venture in China (Foshan, Guangdong). The 
Group, today controlled by Immsi Spa (Roberto Colaninno), in 2009 had a consolidated 
turnover of €1487 million with Ebitda of €200 million. Sales in more than 50 countries are 
performed by own commercial affiliates, joined by a network of 11.000 independent 
distributive agents in Europe, 300 dealers in USA and 250 exclusive dealers in India. 
Piaggio & C was started in 1887 by Enrico and Rinaldo Piaggio, initially supplying 
shipbuilding furniture, subsequently oriented to airplanes and railway equipment. The 
Pontedera plant (Pisa), where still today are located the Group’s Headquarters, was built in 
1924 and until WWII was focused on rail and aero transport equipment. At the end of the 
43war Enrico Piaggio (Rinaldo’s son) encouraged Corradini D’Ascanio, an experienced aero 
engineer and inventor, to design a friendly two-wheel vehicle suitable for short distances and 
easy travel with baggage. The first Vespa 98cc was launched in 1946 selling for 55.000 lire 
(about $90), quite an affordable price for young and low-income people in those early 
postwar period. Production of Vespa under licence started soon in Germany, France, Spain, 
Belgium and UK. In 1948 Piaggio launched Ape, the three wheel fully covered motorcar, 
also quickly become very popular as light working vehicle. The cumulative production of 
Vespa reached 1 million in 1960, 4 million in 1970, 10 million in 1988, 17 million in 2009. 
Since 2006 annual production exceeds 100.000 units, with multiple versions ranging from 
50cc to 300cc. Since the glamourous movie “Vacanze romane” with Gregory Peck and 
Audrey Hepburn (1953) Vespa has become almost a synonym of scooter. 
In 1964 IAM Rinald Piaggio took a separate company status, concentrated on 
aeroplanes and rail equipment, while Umberto Agnelli joined as shareowner of Piaggio & C. 
and became its president in 1965 upon the death of Enrico Piaggio. Acquisition of 
motorcycle brands started with Gilera in 1969. The young Giovanni Alberto Agnelli 
(Umberto’s son) entered the board in 1988, became president in 1994, but after his 
premature death in 1997 the company’s control was first taken over by Morgan Grenfell 
Private Equity (1999), then by the industrial and real estate holding Immsi Spa (listed in 
Milano stock exchange) with Roberto Colaninno currently CEO (2003). Since the 
acquisition of Aprilia-Moto Guzzi group in 2004 Piaggio became the first Italian player in 
the market of two wheels, with 35% of the Italian market and 24% of the European market, 
second to the dominant Japanese companies (mainly Honda).  
After substantial investment in R&D, also in technological cooperation agreements 
with the Chinese group Zongshen, in 2007 the company started to sell scooters and 
commercial vehicles with hybrid and electric motoring at low cost and low environmental 
impact and suitable for rich as well as emerging markets. Research is also targeting new 
diesel engines. The hybrid scooter HyS allows completely non-emission driving in urban 
areas through electric motor and normal gasoline driving at higher speed outside. In 2008 a 
feasibility plan was signed for producing in Chongquin a range of three-four wheel light 
vehicles. 
After a few failed attempts to enter the promising Indian market, started with a 
commercial agreements with Bajaj Auto group back in 1960, stopped by nationalization of 
Bajaj in 1971 imposed by Indira Gandhi and relaunched in 1998 through a joint venture 51-
49% with Greaves for developing commercial vehicles, in 2001 Piaggio took over the 
remaining 49%. Piaggio is currently leader in the Indian market of three wheels vehicles 
(41% market share) and is targeting the motorcycles market by investing in new plants in 
2010-2012. 
A new plant with capacity of 100.000 vehicles per annum has been started in Vietnam 
(Hanoi) in 2009.  
While the main planning and research resources are still concentrated by the Italian 
headquarters in Pontedera, the group is pushing strongly to expand production and 
commercial network to the fast growing South and East Asian markets (eyeing the African 
market in perspective) and hopes to reach an overall turnover of €1.9 billion within the next 
three years. With 16 million two wheel vehicles and an annual growth of 6%, China is by far 
the largest world market, while demand for 8 million vehicles in India has recently been 
44growing at an annual rate of 14%. The overall European market in 2009 was less than 1.9 
million vehicles, of which 1.2 million scooters. The US-Canada market was less than 
500.000 units.  
6. Concluding  remarks 
Looking at the long term multinational evolution of major “old protagonists” and “one-
season protagonists” of the Italian industry, one may notice the repeated failure in attempts 
to carry out durable and successful strategies of alliances and/or mergers with other foreign 
large and medium-large competitors. The major cases in point that have been recalled are the 
following: 
a)  Fiat with Citroen (1970-73), Ford (1984-85), General Motors (2000-05); 
b)   Pirelli with Michelin (mid-60s), Dunlop (1970-81), Continental (1990-91), 
not to speak of the failed attempt to buy the American Firestone against the winning 
offer by the Japanese Bridgestone in 1988; 
c)  Olivetti with Underwood and GE (1960-68), AT&T (1984-89); 
d)  Montecatini with Shell (Monteshell 1964) with Hercules (Himont 1983) 
Ausimont (1985-late 90s). 
The explanation of the episodes, and of the consequent failure by the major Italian 
industrial groups to join and solidly keep position within the world oligopolistic core, must 
be searched first of all in the myopia and lack of competence of the private entrepreneurship 
(Fiat, Pirelli, Olivetti): a mixture of lack of stable strong shareowner leadership, volatility in 
strategic decisions, managerial inadequacy, ambiguities in governance rules following more 
ambitious international operations, excessive leverage. In addition, concerning the history of 
major public-private Italian multinationals (Montedison, Enimont), one must point to a 
stubborn perverse interference or power sharing of the old-fashioned political parties’ arm 
with the domestic big business. 
The reasons for Italy being a latecomer in the postwar period as an international 
investors (“New protagonists”) have been pointed out as a mix of: a) sectoral specialization 
(traditional and specialized suppliers industries inherently less induced to match export with 
FDI strategies); b) structural composition of industry (exceptionally high share of micro and 
small enterprises, far less equipped to undertake the cost of entry in world markets as 
international investors); c) macroeconomic environment up until the late 1980s unfavourable 
to multinational strategies, including the weak and unstable lira exchange rate; d) the 
peculiar State-owned enterprise system, whose strategies have been typically oriented (with 
few exception such as ENI and Finmeccanica) on domestic investment (particularly in the 
Mezzogiorno) and on job creation within domestic boundaries rather than implementing a 
fully-fledged role as multinational players. 
The failure of large State-owned as well as private companies to conquer and maintain 
solid positions within the big oligopolistic game of the world’s top multinationals (unlike 
many European competitors) has been accompanied by a rather robust multinational growth 
by hundreds of medium and medium-large companies well focused on their technological 
and commercial niches, gradually expanding their market penetration beyond the old and 
new European borders. These true representatives of the Italian “fourth capitalism,” born 
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inside and outside the traditional industrial districts, include not only producers of final 
consumer goods belonging to the well known “made in Italy,” but a sizeable number of 
highly specialized suppliers of complex and often advanced products and components. They 
are often well positioned as designers and sellers of sophisticated machinery and equipment, 
as well as of advanced components within the global supply chain of big players on the 
global market in a variety of sectors, ranging from automotive to air transport, shipbuilding, 
construction, oil&gas, power generation and distribution, pharmaceuticals, specialty 
chemicals, engineering. Their competitive advantages are grounded not so much on price-
cost margins, but rather on fast technological adaptation, innovative design, quality control, 
customer-oriented flexible supply.  
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Mineral Processing  - - - - - - - - 5 4 4  10  1 
Chemicals  - - 2 1 - 2 2 7 7 2 9 5 1 
Rubber  4 - 1 3 - - 1 2 4 7  12  7 2 
Mechanical engineering 
(non-electric)  - - - - - 1 - 3 7 7  12  9 7 
Electromechanical 
engineering   - - 1 1 - 3 5 4 6 6 9  10  15 
 Transport Equipment  - - 1 1 - - 4 1 3 4  10  10  5 
Food  2 - - 4 1 1 2 4 5 4 7 8 2 
TAPCC (Fashion Industries)  - - - - - - - - - 4 2 8 2 
Wood  - - - - - - - - 1 1 2 3 - 
Paper  - - 1 - - - - - - - 2 0 1 
Total  6  0  6  10  1  7  14 21 38 39 69 70 36 
Source: N. Acocella (edited by), Le multinazionali italiane, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985, p. 39. 
 
Table 2 – Italian shareholdings abroad at January 1, 2009, by sector 
        
   Investors Firms  Employees  Turnover  
(€ mil.) 
   Total 
Mining and quarrying  33 237  12.124  39.783 
Manufacturing  2.784 6.378 883.285 204.438 
Electricity, gas and water supply  63 813  59.924  46.781 
Construction  326 1.076 60.791 10.084 
Wholesale trade  3.713 11.143 167.537 122.541 
Trasportation and storage  383 1.373 32.704 13.349 
Information and communication  189 606 44.983  12.279 
Other professional activities  482 1.089 90.722 11.258 
Total  6.426 22.715  1.352.070  460.514 
   Fully-controlled foreign subsidiaries 
Mining and quarrying  20 182 8.365  37.053 
Manufacturing  2.327 5.052 688.764 146.794 
Electricity, gas and water supply  35 662  45.884  41.300 
Construction  243 695 43.983 7.144 
Wholesale trade  3.183 9.605 147.950 109.428 
Trasportation and storage  329 1.082 23.405  9.714 
Information and communication  153 514 26.375 9.592 
Other professional activities  435 900 26.528 5.782 
Total  5.699 18.692  1.011.254  366.807 
   Equal and minority shareholdings 
Mining and quarrying  15 55 3.759  2.730 
Manufacturing  894 1.326  194.521  57.644 
Electricity, gas and water supply  30 151  14.040  5.481 
Construction  106 381 16.808 2.940 
Wholesale trade  994 1.538 19.587 13.113 
Trasportation and storage  134 291 9.299 3.635 
Information and communication  50 92  18.608  2.687 
Other professional activities  103 189 64.194 5.476 
Total  1.930 4.023 340.816 93.707 
        
Source: database Reprint, ICE – Polytechnic University of Milan. 
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Table 3 - Employees of foreign firms owned by Italian companies at January 1, 2009, 
by geographical location 
  Shareholdings 
Controlling Equal/Minority 








            
EU-15 398.021  39,4  75.140      473.161  35,0 
– Austria  8.638  0,9  428     9.066  0,7 
– Belgium  13.348  1,3  4.595     17.943  1,3 
– France  104.635  10,3  31.352     135.987  10,1 
– Germany  88.940  8,8  8.192     97.132  7,2 
– Netherlands  9.279  0,9  3.652     12.931  1,0 
– Portugal  8.485  0,8  7.674     16.159  1,2 
– Uk  64.741  6,4  7.162     71.903  5,3 
– Spain  72.537  7,2  6.795     79.332  5,9 
EU-27 180.183  17,8  37.863      218.046  16,1 
– Bulgary  9.351  0,9  1.424     10.775  0,8 
– Poland  48.003  4,7  9.646     57.649  4,3 
– Czech Republic  15.833  1,6 4.256      20.089  1,5 
– Slovak Republic  16.475  1,6  1.869     18.344  1,4 
– Romania  71.620  7,1  10.788     82.408  6,1 
– Hungary  10.596  1,0  5.168     15.764  1,2 
Other Est European countries  68.029  6,7  30.951     98.980  7,3 
– Russia  24.182  2,4  10.778     34.960  2,6 
– Turkey  13.092  1,3  12.963     26.055  1,9 
Other European Country  16.573  1,6  60.429     77.002  5,7 
– Svizzera  13.827  1,4  59.873     73.700  5,5 
Northern Africa  27.523  2,7  11.406     38.929  2,9 
– Morocco  4.061  0,4  7.142     11.203  0,8 
– Tunisia  11.903  1,2  2.848     14.751  1,1 
Other African countries  22.573 2,2  6.110      28.683 2,1 
North America  86.276  8,5  10.581     96.857  7,2 
– USA  79.562  7,9  10.006     89.568  6,6 
Latin America  119.194  11,8  40.335     159.529  11,8 
– Argentina  13.423  1,3  22.870     36.293  2,7 
– Brasil  76.055  7,5  3.769     79.824  5,9 
– Mexico  10.079  1,0  2.736     12.815  0,9 
Middle East  5.430  0,5  2.645     8.075  0,6 
Central Asia  17.066  1,7  12.678     29.744  2,2 
– India  11.444  1,1  4.709     16.153  1,2 
Far East  63.219  6,3  52.426     115.645  8,6 
– China  38.147  3,8  30.796     68.943  5,1 
Oceania 7.167  0,7  252      7.419  0,5 
Total  1.011.254  100,0 340.816      1.352.070  100,0 
 




Table 4 - Employees of foreign firms owned by Italian companies by sector, at January 
1, 2009 
  Shareholdings 
Controlling Equal/Minority
Total 
   N. %  N. 
   
N. % 
  
Traditional sectors  140.563 20,4 39.653    180.216  20,4
   Primary food products  8.044 1,2 5.321    13.365  1,5
   Textile  40.079 5,8 13.408    53.487  6,1
   Wearing Apparel  34.321 5,0 5.643    39.964  4,5
   Leather and related products  20.135 2,9 8.425    28.560  3,2
   Wood and products of wood  10.430 1,5 2.210    12.640  1,4
   Printing   10.635 1,5 2.993    13.628  1,5
   Other manufacturing industries  16.919 2,5 1.653    18.572  2,1
Sectors with strong economies of scale   385.638 56,0 79.639    465.277  52,7
   Other  food products  45.652 6,6 1.680    47.332  5,4
   Beverages  2.628 0,4 2.261    4.889  0,6
   Tobacco products  0 0,0 0    0  0,0
   Paper and paper products  18.405 2,7 265    18.670  2,1
   Coke and refined petroleum products 1.948 0,3 12.654     14.602  1,7
   Basic chemicals  6.493 0,9 1.899    8.392  1,0
   Soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing   
preparations  1.243 0,2 356    1.599  0,2
   Man-made fibres  1.423 0,2 2.845    4.268  0,5
   Tyres and rubber products  24.047 3,5 205    24.252  2,7
   Plastic products  19.824 2,9 4.650    24.474  2,8
   Glass products  8.538 1,2 284    8.822  1,0
   Non-metallic mineral products 55.159 8,0 4.747    59.906  6,8
   Basic metals  32.370 4,7 9.773    42.143  4,8
   Fabricated metal products  33.084 4,8 7.432    40.516  4,6
   Electric domestic appliances  21.696 3,1 672    22.368  2,5
   Wires and cables  11.377 1,7 1.938    13.315  1,5
   Electrical and electronic equipment for motor vehicles  4.948 0,7 688    5.636  0,6
   Other electrical equipment  15.414 2,2 205    15.619  1,8
   Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 57.001 8,3 24.216     81.217  9,2
   Parts and accessories for motor vehicles  24.388 3,5 2.869    27.257  3,1
Specialist sectors  86.327 12,5 11.644    97.971  11,1
   Machinery and mechanical equipment  74.776 10,9 10.153    84.929  9,6
   Electro-mechanical instrumentation  9.160 1,3 1.047    10.207  1,2
   Ships, railway locomotives and rolling stock  2.391 0,3 444    2.835  0,3
Technology-intensive sectors  76.236 11,1 63.585    139.821  15,8
   Other chemical products  14.445 2,1 854    15.299  1,7
   Pharmaceutical products  8.299 1,2 1.134    9.433  1,1
   Office machinery and equipment  1.957 0,3 109    2.066  0,2
   Electronics and communication equipment 28.206 4,1 44.964     73.170  8,3
   Precision mechanical instrumentation  18.693 2,7 2.270    20.963  2,4
   Air and spacecraft  4.636 0,7 14.254    18.890  2,1
   Total  688.764 100,0 194.521    883.285  100,0
 
Source: database Reprint, ICE – Polytechnic University of Milan.           
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Table 5 – Degree of multinationalisation of Italian manufacturing industry according 
to the number of employees of affiliates firms, by sector, at January 1, 2009 
Controlling 
shareholdings  Total 
  
     (a)   (a) 
   
Food and beverages  30,6  35,6 
Textile  31,6 36,6 
Wearing apparel  32,6  37,6 
Leather and related products  33,6 38,6 
Wood and products of wood  34,6 39,6 
Paper and paper products  35,6 40,6 
Printing 36,6  41,6 
Coke and refined petroleum products  37,6  42,6 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals  38,6  43,6 
Rubber and plastic products  39,6  44,6 
Non-metallic mineral products  40,6  45,6 
Basic metals  41,6  46,6 
Fabricated metal products  42,6  47,6 
Machinery and equipment  43,6  48,6 
Office machinery  44,6  49,6 
Electrical equipment  45,6  50,6 
Electronics and communication equipment  46,6  51,6 
Precision mechanical instrumentation  47,6  52,6 
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories  48,6  53,6 
Other transport equipment  49,6  54,6 
Other manufacturins industries  50,6  55,6 
Total  51,6 56,6 
          
          
Employees of foreign firms controlled by Italian companies   
(a) 
Employees in Italy of Italian-based companies   
          

















54Table 6 - New investments of Italian companies in foreign manufacturing firms, by 
year, 1986-2008 (a) 
Controlling Shareholdings     Equal and Minority 
Shareholdings        Total Shareholdings 
  
Firms  Employees   Firms  Employees   Firms  Employees 
     
1986   93  44.615    23  18.810    116  63.425 
1987   123  40.111    40  23.905    163  64.016 
1988   155  24.569    37  22.212    192  46.781 
1989   145  27.661    67  34.072    212  61.733 
1990    202  33.387  107  22.705  309  56.092 
1991   247  65.404    87  24.688    334  90.092 
1992    408  82.399  119  37.765  527  120.164 
1993   236  45.999    95  17.059    331  63.058 
1994   335  28.680    92  16.263    427  44.943 
1995    303  30.244  110  14.326  413  44.570 
1996    346  37.504  110  13.304  456  50.808 
1997    366  37.312  141  24.886  507  62.198 
1998    450  50.148  192  17.760  642  67.908 
1999    525  70.264  122  15.966  647  86.230 
2000   328  59.351    61  34.939    389  94.290 
2001    312  37.126  104  33.700  421  49.489 
2002   270  51.466    39  12.348    311  54.108 
2003   178  15.749    22  3.070    248  18.983 
2004   271  21.872    88  5.350    359  27.222 
2005   217  24.440    95  11.500    312  35.940 
2006   226  23.381    92  8.340    318  31.721 
2007    265  23.346  113 5.048   378  28.394 
2008   198  24.875    92  4.359    290  29.234 
                 
(a)  There are not considered partial investments (increases of shareholdings in foreign companies already participate), or acquisitions 
from other Italian investors. 
                 


















Table 7 - Divestments by Italian companies in foreign manufacturing firms, by year, 
1986-2008 (a) 
Controlling Shareholdings  Equal and Minority 









        
1986    11 1.544  14 2.271  25 3.815 
1987    28 7.492  28 5.699  56  13.191 
1988    35 8.098  19  16.777  54  24.875 
1989    24 5.172  10 2.556  34 7.728 
1990    38  13.482  24 6.235  62  19.717 
1991    26 6.248  27  15.255  53  21.503 
1992    60  16.481  32  39.679  92  56.160 
1993    100 24.816    47  35.117    147 59.933 
1994    63  12.394  28 7.618  91  20.012 
1995    63  13.580  35  12.144  98  25.724 
1996    108 37.098    52  25.376    160 62.474 
1997    70 9.341  58  16.960   128  26.301 
1998    87 17.476   36  4.781   123  22.257 
1999    108 17.423    49  18.633    157 36.056 
2000    56 8.549  27  21.403  83  29.952 
2001    71  14.228  15 9.763  87  16.882 
2002    181 57.068    20  6.652    208 63.322 
2003    70  14.066  20 2.358  94  15.031 
2004    102 44.011    38  414    127 47.734 
2005    125 37.193    46  2.200    171 39.393 
2006    99 22.063   56  7.529   155  29.592 
2007    104 18.096    36  4.274    140 22.370 
2008    84 10.622   24  1.479   108  12.101 
                 
(a)  There are not considered partial divestments (as a result of which the investor still retains a direct shareholding in the foreign 
firm), or the sale of shareholdings to other Italian investors. 
 
 
Source: database Reprint, ICE – Polytechnic University of Milan. 







56Table 8 - Balance between new investments and divestment of Italian companies in 
foreign manufacturing firms,  by year, 1986-2008 (a) 
Controlling Shareholdings  Equal and Minority 









                
1986    82  43.071   9  16.539   91  59.610 
1987   95  32.619   12  18.206    107  50.825 
1988   120  16.471    18  5.435    138  21.906 
1989    121  22.489   57  31.516   178  54.005 
1990    164  19.905   83  16.470   247  36.375 
1991   221  59.156    60  9.433    281  68.589 
1992   348  65.918    87  -1.914    435  64.004 
1993   136  21.183    48  -18.058    184  3.125 
1994   272  16.286    64  8.645    336  24.931 
1995   240  16.664    75  2.182    315  18.846 
1996   238  406    58  -12.072    296  -11.666 
1997   296  27.971    83  7.926    379  35.897 
1998   363  32.672   156  12.979   519  45.651 
1999   417  52.841    73  -2.667    490  50.174 
2000    272  50.802   34  13.536   306  64.338 
2001    241  22.898   89  23.937   334  32.607 
2002   89  -5.602   19  5.696    103  -9.214 
2003   108  1.683    2  712    154  3.952 
2004   169  -22.139    50  4.936    232  -20.512 
2005   92  -12.753   49  9.300    141  -3.453 
2006   127  1.318    36  811    163  2.129 
2007   161  5.250    78  774    239  6.024 
2008   114  14.254    68  2.880    182  17.134 
                
(a)  There are not considered partial investments or divestments 
 
Source: database Reprint, ICE – Polytechnic University of Milan. 
 
      
57 
 
Fig. 1 Outward/Inward stock FDI (% of world total, 
2009) 
Source: UNCTAD (2010) 














Source: UNCTAD (2010) 
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